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ABSTRACT 
Do Financial Incentives Make a Difference? A Study of Dual Eligible Medicare Advantage 
Primary Care Providers and Quality Gaps in Care for the Dual Eligible Population 
by 
Estevan Rodriguez 
August 2018 
Chair: Dr. Karen Loch 
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business 
The regulatory arm of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) strictly 
tracks quality compliance via Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) 
reporting, which captures rich data in order to drive value-based healthcare delivery. Health 
plans are empowered to drive quality results via performance-based contracting, and have 
instituted financial incentive agreements to improve care delivery for the Dual Eligible Medicare 
Advantage (MA) patient population. As a result, there is enhanced focus on Dual Eligible MA 
quality, which has received pronounced attention lately.  
As a way to improve Dual Eligible MA Primary Care Provider (PCP) quality, financial 
incentives have been offered by health plans with the expectation of building a high 
performance, quality driven network. Specific quality measures outlined in this study are 
identified in relation to the targeted, incentivized providers. A primary objective of the financial 
incentives is adherence to quality standards monitored by the health plans. Focused healthcare 
literature has also laid the groundwork for this study. Motivation theory serves as the theoretical 
lens to answer the question, “Do financial incentives make a difference?” Regulatory pressures 
continue to shape the healthcare environment. This study focuses on pre-financial incentive and 
 x 
financial incentive periods to assess the positive or negative relationship financial incentives 
have on Dual Eligible MA PCP quality.    
Findings show that Dual Eligible MA PCP quality on average is not improving as a result 
of financial incentives. Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates as measured by Dual Eligible 
MA PCP HEDIS quality gaps divided by Dual Eligible MA patients assigned did not show 
decline, but rather an increase (i.e., 1.90 in 2010 to 2.30 in 2014). This is supported for all 
quality measures selected in this study. Assessment of HEDIS gaps using a quantitative approach 
further contributes to the practical healthcare landscape that bridges the gap between theory and 
practice. Analysis of Dual Eligible MA PCP characteristics, i.e., structure, specialty, and gender, 
also elicits the need for continued research along the motivation frontier. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Financial Incentive, Motivation Theory, Dual Eligible Medicare Advantage 
Primary Care Provider (MA PCP), Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
(HEDIS), Quality. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
I.1 Quality in Health Care 
For purposes of this study, quality is defined per clinical definition as the conformance 
and performance to standardized, established measures (Tamimi and Sebastianelli, 1996). Dual 
Eligible Medicare Advantage (MA) patients, or Low Income Seniors, are under strict 
requirements when selecting a Dual Eligible MA plan as the networks are serviced by providers 
who serve not only an aged population, but an economically disadvantaged one as well. The 
guidelines patients must meet are strict and involve Medicaid requirements in order to participate 
in the program. The major implications to members are that services must be performed by 
participating Dual Eligible MA PCPs acting as their gatekeepers of healthcare. The benefit to the 
patient is that any costs not covered under the Dual Eligible MA plan are picked up by Medicaid 
resulting in no out-of-pocket costs to the patient. On the provider side, he or she must accept 
Medicare payment rates, and must promise to hold patients harmless for payment of services 
provided. 
The availability of practice-based support has changed dramatically. For instance, 
software tools to track care opportunities via Electronic Medical Records (EMR) have assisted in 
reducing the administrative burden for countless primary care providers serving patients with 
complex conditions such as Diabetes and Cancer. Historical claim data is available to track and 
trend levels of care and provides details to unveil quality concerns.  
The financial incentives paid by health plans to Dual Eligible MA PCPs are 
operationalized by Healthcare Effectiveness Data Information Set (HEDIS) measures of which 
these benchmarks are used to measure performance based on dimensions of care and service. 
Sixteen (16) measures normally serve as benchmarks tied to financial incentive programs but this 
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varies by health plans. Five (5) of the measures tied to Diabetes and Cancer screenings are 
selected for this study. Many opportunities exist to improve healthcare quality. One of these 
opportunities is the option to use the power of the financial relationships between health plans 
and PCPs to encourage quality. This, in addition to the many tools available for practicing Dual 
Eligible MA PCPs, builds a needed foundation for support.       
I.1.1 Quality in the U.S. – Why is it a Problem? 
Nationally, Medicare Advantage plans (including Dual Eligible plans) for the periods of 
this study have seen significant consolidation per research done by the Kaiser Family Foundation 
(See Figure 1. Average Number of Medicare Advantage Plans Available to Beneficiaries 2009-
2015 below). There has been a thirty-eight percent (38%) reduction in Medicare Advantage 
health plans between calendar years 2009 – 2015 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). This is 
problematic due to a demand-supply situation. For example, the decrease in number of plans 
creates an unanticipated reduction of Dual Eligible MA PCPs needed to satisfy a growing patient 
population. Simply, with too few PCPs in the supply chain and too many patients increasing 
demand, quality suffers.   
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Figure 1 Average Number of Medicare Advantage Plans Available to Beneficiaries 2009-
2015, Kaiser Family Foundation 
 (Source: http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-advantage-2015-data-spotlight-overview-
of-plan-changes). 
 
Added to the mix, the Dual Eligible MA PCP community has witnessed the transition to 
new payment structures, i.e., Pay-for-Performance (P4P) models designed to both control costs 
and advance quality.  Under a P4P reimbursement model, some of the PCP’s compensation is 
tied to the ability to meet agreed upon quality benchmarks. As health plans and Dual Eligible 
MA PCPs transition to a P4P payment model, quality gaps in care receive increased attention 
along with an increased demand for quality improvement. Furthermore, there has been 
significant national and local growth of Medicare Advantage and Dual Eligible MA membership 
year-over-year as evidenced by enrollment details below (See Figure 2. National Medicare 
Advantage Enrollment in 2014 Exceeds Projections by 6 Million Beneficiaries and Table 1. 
Arizona Dual Eligible Medicare Advantage Enrollment Growth). Projected demand of new 
patients under Medicare Advantage was significantly under-estimated by over six (6) million 
patients (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014). The impact is coming into focus as quantitative 
analysis emerges related to PCP quality.    
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Figure 2 National Medicare Advantage Enrollment in 2014 Exceeds Projections by 6 
Million Beneficiaries  
(Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014). 
 
Table 1 Arizona Dual Eligible Medicare Advantage Enrollment Growth 
(Source: www.cms.gov and UHC, 2015). 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
CMS Data (AZ 
MA enrollment - 
www.cms.gov, 
2015)
189,062 193,118 Excluded from study period 214,769 220,406
Year-over-Year 
Growth
2.15% 11.21% 2.62%
Dual Eligible MA 
Enrollment – Male
2,388 3,095 Excluded from study period 5,699 4,635
Dual Eligible MA 
Enrollment – 
Female 
5,572 5,196 Excluded from study period 10,981 9,532
Dual Eligible MA 
Enrollment – Total
7,960 8,291 Excluded from study period 16,680 14,167
Year-over-Year 
Growth
4.16% 101.18% -15.07%
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As the MA patient enrollment growth trend continues, disruption in the healthcare 
landscape results due to fewer exited MA health plans and the enrollment constraints in the Dual 
Eligible MA PCP provider market. The Dual Eligible MA patient growth trend in Arizona in 
2013 increased by over one hundred and one percent (101%) (See Figure 3. Arizona Dual 
Eligible Medicare Advantage Enrollment Growth above). The dominant networks are forced to 
deal with this significant enrollment demand. As a result Dual Eligible MA PCP quality is 
increasingly difficult to maintain and quality gaps in care do not seem to be improving. Burns 
and Pauly (2018) in their healthcare research found P4P did not have a positive impact on 
outcomes and “…found little evidence of changes in quality” (Burns and Pauly, p. 72-73, 2018). 
Given the rapid enrollment growth trend, this problem strikes a chord in the healthcare 
community. There is great pressure to advance quality while keeping up with patient demand 
both nationally and locally in Arizona. 
Healthcare models are constantly evolving in today’s dynamic Dual Eligible MA PCP 
setting. The shift to value-based payment methods (i.e., P4P) has changed in the healthcare 
marketplace. Conrad and Christianson (2004) support this view in their study on the changing 
dynamics. They further add that a new conceptual mindset is needed that considers the evolving 
complex framework. Moving from the macro perspective, claim data from a specific plan of 
practicing Arizona Dual Eligible MA PCPs provides further visibility to the issue. Dual Eligible 
MA PCPs, health plans, and patients see room for quality improvement.     
As the demand for quality grows, payers engage in a variety of incentives such as benefit 
reduction for patients, jeopardized roster assignment for payers, and increased oversight in an 
effort to improve the use of evidence based practices. In turn, health plans consider how they can 
motivate participating providers towards higher quality. As greater scrutiny is placed on quality, 
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health plans want to know if financial incentives, as a motivating factor, matter. Efforts are 
underway that seek to motivate higher quality. Financial incentives serve as a mechanism to 
motivate quality and are directly tied to HEDIS quality improvement.   
At odds in the healthcare landscape are the Dual Eligible MA PCPs who are challenged 
with not only the complexity of treating an aging population, but additionally with administrative 
pressures due to HEDIS quality tracking that can increase the administrative burden associated 
with providing the patient’s care. In the highly regulated healthcare system, there are many 
checks and balances needed to ensure quality. Specific Dual Eligible MA PCP services, such as 
routine healthcare visits and screenings, ensure proper delivery of care and quality gap closure 
which is required in the pay-for-performance landscape.   
I.2 Quality Initiatives 
I.2.1 Private Sector 
The private sector, for health insurance purposes, relates to individual and or group 
coverage, commonly referred to as “Commercial” coverage. For the sake of this study, the 
private sector is out of scope, but is a category worth brief mention. Private plans are also 
available to supplement Medicare insurance coverage for services referred to as “gaps” not 
covered by traditional Medicare. These Medicare members pay for the services they receive at 
private fee for service rates per the benefit agreement they enroll in.  
Medicare has two distinct components: Part A, which covers inpatient hospital care, 
skilled nursing facility, hospice, lab tests, surgery, and home healthcare and Part B, which covers 
medical services deemed medically necessary and preventive services. Private sector members 
normally comply with, and are engaged in the care delivered by their providers. Problems start to 
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emerge when diving into the public Dual Eligible MA segment, which this study further 
investigates.          
I.2.2 Public (Dual Eligible) Sector 
As the extent of new healthcare legislation further unfolds, the importance of primary 
care quality remains an extremely relevant topic in the public sector (Baker, Hopkins, Dixon, 
Ridout, and Geppert, 2004). This empirical examination adds further clarity to the quality 
dilemma facing the healthcare industry. Similarly, this study focuses on a public Dual Eligible 
MA PCP network in Arizona to consider the relationship financial incentives have on quality. 
The Dual Eligible MA PCP structure, specialty, and gender are analyzed with specific focus on 
HEDIS quality measures related to Cancer and Diabetes screenings.   
HEDIS measures provide specific quality information. A research opportunity has been 
granted given the identified MA patient growth trend, movement from Fee-for-Service to P4P, 
and contractual performance requirements in healthcare (See figure 3. Fee-for-Service Transition 
to Pay-for-Performance below).  
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Figure 3 Fee-for-Service Transition to Pay-for-Performance  
(P4P). 
I.3 Specific Dual Eligible Medicare Advantage Plan  
United Healthcare (UHC) is a leading Dual Eligible Medicare Advantage health plan 
serving the MA population both in Arizona and nationally. Dual Eligible MA PCP claims track 
quality by assessing adherence to guidelines in the provision of care. We rely on a subset of these 
measures to provide insight into quality by tracking the five (5) HEDIS quality measures in this 
study. UHC uses this data to ensure quality standards of care are being met. Procedures 
impacting quality are easily acquired from the claim details to see trends. Open HEDIS care gaps 
tied to the quality measures are analyzed for reporting purposes. While this study is limited to 
five (5) measures, other measures that are reported via claim submission could also be analyzed 
for added benefit and future research. For incentive purposes, the sixteen (16) measures listed in 
Table 2. HEDIS Quality Measures below are generally tied to a financial incentive. While not all 
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the measures in this study are included for review, the five (5) selected are important as they 
provide useful insight into chronic conditions, such as Diabetes and Cancer, faced by the Dual 
Eligible MA population and vital for disease management. 
Table 2 HEDIS Quality Measures 
(www.ncqa.org, 2015) 
HEDIS QUALITY MEASURES 
  
Measures - Included in Study 
  
1) Breast Cancer Screening 
2) Colorectal Cancer Screening 
3) Blood Sugar Screening 
4) Eye Exam Screening 
5) Kidney Disease Screening 
Measures - Excluded from Study 
  
6) Adult BMI Assessment 
7) Care for Older Adults – Medication Review 
8) Care for Older Adults - Functional Status Assessment 
9) Care for Older Adults - Pain Assessment 
10) Osteoporosis Management in Women who had a Fracture 
11) Controlling for Blood Pressure 
12) Rheumatoid Arthritis Management 
13) High Risk Medication 
14) Medication Adherence for Diabetes Medications 
15) Medication Adherence for Hypertension 
16) Medication Adherence for Cholesterol 
 
Motivation theory suggests that financial incentives result in improved quality, or lower 
HEDIS quality gaps. The pre-financial incentive and financial incentive details observed can be 
used to show whether financial incentives matter with respect to quality gap reduction or not. 
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I.4  Research Questions (RQ) 
RQ1: Are financial incentives as implemented within one Dual Eligible MA network 
associated with higher likelihood of Dual Eligible MA PCP attainment of predetermined 
benchmarks for quality on five (5) specific HEDIS measures; namely 1) Breast Cancer 
Screening, 2) Colorectal Cancer Screening, 3) Blood Sugar (HbA1c) Screening, 4) Eye Exam 
Screening, and 5) Kidney Disease Screening?  
RQ2: To what extent are structure, specialty, and gender associated with quality 
improvement in the study period? 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW (THEORETICAL FRAMING) AND HYPOTHESES 
The healthcare literature provides the theoretical framing for this study. There is 
comprehensive literature specific to financial incentives and selected to inform on the topic of 
motivation for quality by Dual Eligible MA PCPs. Adding focus to the specialized Dual Eligible 
MA PCP segment provides insight into the Value Based Purchasing landscape where providers 
are incentivized for performance. Greater attention is being placed on the Dual Eligible MA PCP 
segment as a result of transition to alternative payment models that put providers at some risk for 
the high cost of caring for Dual Eligible MA enrollees (Damberg, Sorbero, Lovejoy, Martsolf, 
Raaen, and Mandel, 2014). 
Based on Motivation Theory, Herzberg, Maussner, and Snyderman (1959) state in their 
book “Motivation to Work” that “…it is possible to set up large groups that differ significantly 
with respect to some specific variable or group of variables. These groups can then be compared 
in an attempt to discover the relationship between these variables and various other measures” 
(Herzberg, et al., p. 11). Using this framework, the assertion of the hypotheses can be 
investigated using specific pre-financial incentive and financial incentive HEDIS quality data. 
The term motivation as defined by Merriam-Webster is used as it relates to this study:   
“The act or process of giving someone a reason for doing something: the act  
or process of motivating someone; the condition of being eager to act or work;  
the condition of being motivated; a force or influence that causes someone  
to do something” (Source: http://www.merriam-webster.com. November 2015). 
 
Classic theory with respect to motivation by Herzberg (1959, Motivation-Hygiene Two-
Factor Theory) lends exceptional value to this research. His theory advances the understanding 
and complexity of motivation. Using the accepted definition above and Motivation Theory as a 
guide, this study assists in understanding the relationship financial incentives have on Dual 
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Eligible MA PCP quality. I have selected Herzberg’s theory to examine pre-financial incentive 
and financial incentive quality from an extrinsic motivation perspective.   
Herzberg’s Two Factor Theory and concept of Extrinsic (Hygiene) factors are useful in 
this examination. Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman (1959) suggest that “hygiene and 
motivation and the relationship of these complexes of factors to the behavior of men (or women) 
has many implications for practice” (Herzberg, et al., p. 119). Further analysis at the individual 
Dual Eligible MA PCP level with identification of HEDIS gaps provides an observable 
relationship over time.  
Analysis of detailed pre-financial incentive and financial incentive data is useful in 
assessing changes in quality. Theoretical framing along with empirical data adds further 
relevance to this study. The relationship between extrinsic (hygiene) factors and quality can 
provide useful assessment quantitatively. Interestingly, literature is mixed with respect to P4P, 
i.e., paying for quality. Herzberg, et al. (1959) also point out that “overemphasis on hygiene is 
not enough” (Ibid. p. 131-132). Figure 4. Motivation Theory Model below adapts Herzberg’s 
Two-Factor Motivation Theory as the selected framework to this study.  
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Figure 4 Motivation Theory Model. 
Improving quality gaps is a top priority in the healthcare industry. The health plans’ goal 
of ensuring quality and rewarding the Dual Eligible MA PCPs with a financial incentive is not so 
clear. The examination of HEDIS measures opens opportunities to investigate the relationship 
financial incentives have on healthcare quality. Also useful in this analysis is viewing the 
relationship through the lens of structure, specialties, and gender along with underlying 
characteristics associated to the Dual Eligible MA PCPs. This area has been scrutinized carefully 
to add further insight. Literature has generated much needed inquiry regarding healthcare quality. 
Health plans are intending to shape the desired provider behaviors. Herzberg, Mausner, 
and Snyderman (1959) indicate that future research needs to investigate individual level effects 
that determine motivation (Herzberg, et al., p. 100). At the forefront, researchers must look at 
what the statistical data shows while considering Motivation Theory in an empirical healthcare 
setting. 
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Evidence in the given literature suggests that effectiveness of financial incentives are 
limited when it comes to improving quality. Various studies aligning to the healthcare segment 
and quality lend further credence to the analysis. Studies that indicate where P4P is working or 
not working is essential in contextualizing the findings to lend support to an empirical analysis.  
Existing literature reviewed in relation to financial incentives in healthcare include but 
are not limited to research by the following studies presented here. Literature has been reviewed 
on the topic of structure, specialty, and gender:   
II.1 Structure 
Town, Wholey, Kralewski, and Dowd (2004) state that “outcomes are not under control 
of providers and the link of pay to performance is not always observable” (Town, et al., p. 86S). 
Important elements of structure were identified to “inform relative to incentive effects” (Ibid. p. 
99S). These authors ask “How does the incentive context affect the desired behavior?” and 
“Given the incentive context, how much can incentives affect the desired behavior?” (Ibid. p. 
112S). They identify specific concerns in development of theory about incentives and indicate 
motivation needs to be considered relative to incentive research.    
Mehrotra, Pearson, Coltin, Kleinman, Singer, Rabson, and Schneider (2007) conducted 
interviews (N = 79) and their findings indicate that incentives are “tied to improved (HEDIS) 
quality and that structure is important” (Mehrotra, et al, p.252 - 253). They concluded however 
that “incentives improving quality is unclear” (Ibid. p.254). Their findings suggest positive 
association between P4P and HEDIS measures. A large percentage of respondents reported 
moderate to very important impact on performance (thirty six percent 36%) and moderate to 
significant impact on the group (fifty six percent 56%). Interestingly, a small percentage (twelve 
percent 12%) of providers feel quality of care is an issue (Ibid. p. 252). These authors also point 
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out the importance of structure in relation to quality. Group characteristics are highlighted in 
their study to emphasize the understanding of incentive and quality optimization. Additionally, 
they showed that financial incentives can be used “…as a mechanism to improve clinical 
quality” and suggest that pay for performance incentives are “…viewed as a cornerstone of 
efforts to improve quality” (Ibid. pp, 252-253). 
Korda and Eldridge (2011) recognized that obtaining healthcare value relies on incentives 
and integrated patient care. (Korda and Eldridge, p. 277). These authors, in their broad literature 
review, found evidence for improved quality and lower healthcare costs under the Federally 
Qualified Healthcare (FQHC) and Patient Centered Medical Home (PCMH) models. They 
noticed less influence and control of PCPs in PCMH and FQHC settings resulting in improved 
quality and lower cost. PCMH and FQHC structures are enabled to see large numbers of Dual 
Eligible MA patients. The evidence is mixed with regard to P4P and there is a noted unintended 
consequence of “…inappropriate measures and objectives, competing or uncoordinated efforts, 
insufficient or inappropriate incentives, and excessive focus on the reward” (Ibid., p. 282). In 
their literature review, they conclude with respect to payment of incentives that the healthcare 
providers must “translate, apply, and align to serve the challenging populations” (Ibid., p. 286).       
Van Herck, de Smedt, Annemans, Remmen, Rosenthal, and Sermeus (2010) conducted a 
literature review identifying teams of providers and individual providers explicitly receiving 
incentives was conflicting as to effectiveness. “Some studies reported groups performed better 
on P4P than individual practices while others reported the opposite.” (Van Herck, et al, p. 7). In 
their systematic literature review of P4P effects of one-hundred twenty-eight (128) studies 
between 2004 and 2009 with one-hundred and eleven (111) studies in a primary care setting, 
their review found highest rates of improvement and clinical effectiveness for chronic care, such 
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as Diabetes, after P4P implementation. The studies reported positive results. They also identified 
a “…positive relationship between P4P performance effects and an organizational culture that 
supports the coordination of care.” (Ibid. pp. 6-7). These authors identify the need for further 
research on the domain of patient-centeredness. They also found that “Pay-for-Performance 
(P4P) did not have negative effects on patients before and after identified for performance.” 
(Ibid. p. 4-5). They advise to use caution in evaluating P4P in the healthcare landscape due to 
variability of the findings in their review.   
Petersen, Woodard, Urech, Daw, and Sookanan (2006) whose study synthesis (N = 17) 
found marginal support for incentives in their study. They also pointed out that “very few articles 
lend support that incentives improve quality” (Petersen, et al., p. 268). These authors provide 
further insight into the area of financial incentives in their systematic literature review of 
empirical studies between 1980 and 2005. They argue per their review of seventeen (17) studies 
that performance payments can have a positive effect on measures of quality in healthcare. These 
authors examined quality and found “partial or positive effects of financial incentives on 7 of 9 
studies” for breast cancer screening and blood sugar screening quality (Significance P = .02) 
(Ibid. p. 267). Their findings suggest statistically improved quality when comparing rates before 
and after a quality incentive program. This method is similarly undertaken for this current 
empirical study. Notably, structures per the authors’ study design played a key role in the 
examination of quality in their study. They developed a relevant proposed research agenda to 
study incentives in healthcare. The authors suggest structure adds relevance to the domain of 
healthcare quality. Interestingly, “adverse selection” (avoiding ill patients) and “gaming 
behavior” were uncovered that are a current unintended consequence of incentive programs 
enhancing the need for monitoring (Ibid. p.268). 
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Conrad and Perry (2009) whose Behavior/Economist view of evidence (empirical study, 
N = 10, focused on preventive services) identified "positive, but mixed" incentive effect findings 
(Conrad and Perry, p. 362-363). These authors consider a blending of microeconomics, agency 
theory, behavioral economics, and cognitive psychology in their view on the topic of financial 
incentives motivated by a conceptual framework. The economist view seeks to maximize patient 
health subject to provider constraints and limited resources. The authors developed propositions 
as predictors of financial incentive effects on clinical quality. They argue that motivation for 
improved quality can be impacted by size, certainty, and frequency of incentives from an 
economic perspective on quality. Based on the synthesis of peer-reviewed data they conclude 
that, “properly designed, selective financial incentives can improve quality of health services on 
the dimensions of structure, process, and outcome” (Ibid. p. 365). 
Opposing views regarding paying for quality are also part of the literature selected. For 
instance, Burns and Pauly (2018) suggest that "the impact of both payment and organizational 
models is weak" (Burns and Pauly, p. 57) and Himmelstein, Ariely, and Woolhandler (2014) 
indicate performance worsens with rewards, and rewards undermine motivation with respect to 
tasks with high intrinsic motivation. These authors conducted a meta-analysis (N = 128) and 
found that, “Studies have shown that monetary rewards can undermine motivation (negative 
effects) and worsen performance” (Himmelstein, et al., p. 203). Their study offers a compelling 
argument against financial incentives given the shift to P4P and the need for further research 
focused on HEDIS quality in the practical healthcare setting. They also state that, “People 
respond to rewards which underlie P4P programs that aim to upgrade health care quality and 
efficiency by offering carefully tailored financial incentives for desirable behaviors” (Ibid. p. 
203).  These authors noted slim and mixed evidence of benefits on improvement regardless of 
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widespread embrace of P4P and concluded that incentives can certainly change healthcare, but 
not necessarily for the better. For instance, these authors claim that paying for quality is toxic 
and “undermines motivation and worsens performance” (Ibid. p. 203). They suggest that 
evidence is slim despite provider support and that “variation in performance is caused by 
variation in motivation and incentive pay is unlikely to improve performance” (Ibid. p. 204). 
Rice (2015) also suggests that research finds that health plans “struggle to find models that 
improve quality” (Rice, p. 2) and that there is “no evidence pay-for-performance works" (Ibid. p. 
3).  
While extrinsic factors are not enough to support quality, Herzberg (1959) suggests their 
absence can lead to behavioral dissatisfaction and should be seen as an important factor. Kaplan, 
Brady, Dritz, Hooper, Linam, Froehle, and Margolis (2010) whose study synthesis (N = 47) 
found incentives aligned to quality improvement showed positive results (Kaplan, et al., p. 523). 
However, these authors shed light on mixed results regarding quality in the literature review 
analyzing differing contexts inclusive of motivation to change as an important factor. Aspects of 
context considered in their research include characteristics of individuals and motivation within 
an inner setting involving structure, networks, and climate. For example, in situations where the 
“tension for change or the degree to which individual’s believe the current situation requires 
change” (Kaplan, et al., p. 501), contextual factors were found to have significant, positive 
association with respect to quality improvement. They found that “practices with greater capacity 
to change (motivation + ability) delivered preventive services to eligible patients at higher rates 
(pre/post change)…and they showed a significant interaction between motivation and ability” 
(Ibid. p. 518).   
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Hypothesis (H1): HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates for Single 
Specialty, Multispecialty, and FQHC structures decreased, i.e., improved quality care, in 
the financial incentive period.  
II.2 Specialty 
Hunt, Kreiner, and Brody (2012) conducted an interview study of FQHC specialty 
providers (N = 58) the sample of which included physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician 
assistants active in primary care to assess clinical care issues focused on Diabetes and 
Hypertension. The authors identified an alarming trend regarding chronic disease management 
reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) between 1998 – 2003 (10 
million increased cases for Diabetes and 22 million increased cases for Hypertension). They 
suggest that P4P incentives further increase problems related to patient care, for example, in the 
“aggressive use of pharmaceuticals” (Hunt, et al., p. 453).  
Baker, Hopkins, Dixon, Ridout, and Geppert (2004) added a quantitative approach and 
found that financial incentives can contribute to provider quality for six (6) HEDIS measures 
focused on cancer, Obstetric, and diabetes care by “…including efforts to educate patients, the 
development of reminder systems, and the use of financial incentives” (Baker, et al., p. 25). 
These authors quantitatively examined variation of quality for twenty-one (21) HMOs in an 
urbanized California setting. Selection of HEDIS measures from the National Committee on 
Quality Assurance (NCQA) provide needed data to determine its influence on quality. They 
suggest providers and plans “work together and not alone to impact quality” (Baker, et al., p.20). 
Their study found that health plans have an influence on provider quality (p <.05).   
Rosenthal, Landon, Howitt, Song, and Epstein (2007) in their interview (N = 27) case 
study on incentives found that incentives can have positive effect on behavior. They suggest that 
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“paying for higher quality is fairer than paying for quantity of services” (Rosenthal, et al., p. 
1679). These authors examined the initial hypotheses stating that “payers with greater market 
share and larger incentives find P4P more effective and that P4P…leads to concerns to simply 
pay more to providers…of high quality; and P4P increase incentives to avoid challenging 
patients” (Ibid. p. 1675). Dealing with a difficult Dual Eligible MA population adds to the 
difficulty further complicated by growth which is out of the control of the providers. Patients 
assigned may be a mix to include non-compliant individuals further impacting the quality 
deterioration.  
The respondents in the Rosenthal, et al. (2007) study found it too early, at the time of 
their study, to expect changes in performance due to significant challenges in identifying the 
impact on performance. They did note a positive impact for providers with higher market share 
along with higher rewards. They also identified three important motivators to sustain P4P: 1) 
formulation of the right mix, 2) fairness in paying for quality, and 3) transparency of 
performance. Furthermore, they argue “…due to benchmark performance on quality measures, 
incentives can in theory change provider behavior” (Ibid. p. 1680).      
Friedberg, Safran, Coltin, Dresser, and Schneider (2010), whose study incorporated 
simulation models, found that mean HEIDS scores of various providers serving vulnerable 
populations did not improve. Their study found that providers (N = 438) serving low 
socioeconomic patients had lowest performance scores (Friedberg, et al., p. 929). These authors 
found that “…performance-based payments may disproportionately flow away from practices 
caring for vulnerable populations” (Ibid. p. 931). They analyzed mean 2007 HEDIS data for 
economically vulnerable patients and found modest disparity among the measures for 
economically vulnerable populations. For example, the gap between cancer screening measures, 
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i.e.,  breast cancer screening was seventy seven percent (77%) and colorectal cancer screening 
was sixty percent (60%); for diabetes screening measures, i.e., eye exam screening was seventy 
four percent (74%) and cholesterol screening was eighty eight percent (88%). The authors 
concluded that “It is possible that within practice disparities could worsen if practices do not 
receive the resources necessary to improve the care delivered to vulnerable populations (Ibid. pp. 
929-930). Also, there is noted within practice flexibility for the studied Dual Eligible MA 
population, but health plan guidelines prevent care outside of provider assignment leading to 
added difficulty in gap closure of screening measures.     
Hypothesis (H2): M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General Practice, and Internal 
Medicine) and Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and Physician Assistant) Specialty Dual 
Eligible quality gap rates improved in the financial incentive period. 
II.3 Gender 
Conrad and Christianson (2004) suggest from their literature synthesis that financial 
incentives are a “black box” that needs to be penetrated. The authors suggest that factors or 
predictors that influence quality outcomes need further investigation. Factors such as structure, 
specialty, and gender characteristics are relevant in this examination. Using the practical 
healthcare landscape and previous healthcare financial incentive research as a guide, this study 
will further the investigation of financial incentives with respect to motivation of quality in the 
P4P landscape. An important gap in the model has been identified stating that, “There is 
important literature …that addresses aspects of …motivation and the relationship to the 
application and effects of incentives” (Conrad and Christianson, p. 58S). They also found that 
“…a major cause of compromised patient care was due “systemic failure in care delivery and 
financial incentives in the present environment” (Ibid. p. 44S). The authors are not suggesting 
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that quality incentives compromise care, but rather that the overarching financial incentives in 
the system are not aligned with improving care. 
Hoff (2010) advanced the claim that women are the “new face of primary care” (Hoff, p. 
133) due to their ability to nurture, have dialogue, and connect with patients emotionally. This is 
especially important for the Dual Eligible segment and females are poised to meet the demand.  
Hypothesis (H3): Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates will be lower in the 
financial incentive period. 
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III STUDY DESIGN 
Medicare Advantage plans have existed since the 1970s. In general, health plans offer 
Part A (hospital coverage) and Part B (medical coverage) and, depending on the health plan, 
have a deductible and co-pay. Dual Eligible MA PCPs also need to accept traditional Medicare, 
and be participating in the network of the Dual Eligible MA health plan in order to see its 
members. Generally, Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are relatively similar 
in nature, but differ with regard to the benefits offered. Dual Eligible MA health plans reward 
Dual Eligible MA PCPs with financial incentives for achieving HEDIS quality standards, and 
reward the members with reduced copays and enhanced benefits over and above traditional 
Medicare as a way to increase enrollment. The basic types of plans are HMOs and Preferred 
Provider Organizations (PPOs). Complexity occurs very quickly in distinguishing between these 
two, but for the sake of this study the main focus is on the HMO Dual Eligible MA PCP provider 
segment. 
Table 3 Study Criteria  
Criteria Included in this study Excluded from this study 
Health Plan  United Healthcare (UHC)  Non-United Healthcare Plans excluded 
Period Years 2010 through 2014 Year 2012 (Transition period) 
Patient 
Selection  
Maricopa County (Arizona) Dual 
Eligible Medicare Advantage 
patients  
Medicare Advantage patients in Arizona 
who were: 
1. Not dually eligible for Medicaid 
2. Not residents of Maricopa 
County 
HEDIS 
Measures 
Five (5) HEDIS Quality Measures 
focused on Cancer and Diabetes 
Screening 
Eleven (11) HEDIS Measures excluded 
but opportunities exist for further 
examination (part of incentive 
agreement) 
Providers UHC Participating Dual Eligible 
MA PCPs in pre-financial incentive 
& incentive periods (N = 1,252) 
Non-participating Dual Eligible MA 
PCPs or UHC participating, but not in all 
years of study period. 
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Included in this study are only Dual Eligible MA PCPs with claim activity in both the 
pre-financial incentive and financial incentive periods (i.e., calendar years 2010 through 2014), 
serving the urban Arizona (Maricopa County) Dual Eligible MA segment, and limited to five (5) 
HEDIS quality measures applicable to a financial incentive.  
Excluded from this study are non-participating Dual Eligible MA PCPs or those 
participating, but not in all years of interest, non-United Healthcare plans, calendar Year 2012 
(i.e., transition period), activity related to HEDIS measures not selected for this study, and non-
Dual Eligible MA patients, and, or those residing outside of Maricopa County, Arizona (See 
Table 3. Study Criteria). 
The Dual Eligible MA PCPs selected will contribute further understanding of the 
financial incentives’ impact on quality. The providers selected consist of one thousand two 
hundred and fifty two (1,252) individual Dual Eligible MA PCPs who were in the health plan for 
both the pre-financial incentive and financial incentive periods. Dual Eligible MA PCPs who 
were added to the plan during the study period are excluded from this study as well. Practices 
that were enrolled but had turnover of Dual Eligible MA PCPs were also excluded from the data 
set. Dual Eligible MA PCPs include any provider who is assigned a Dual Eligible MA patient 
and provides care in the course of their duties and includes Medical Doctors and Doctors of 
Osteopathic Medicine which include Family Practice, General Practice, and Internal Medicine 
providers, and Midlevel providers which include Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants.   
The study design provides a simple view of the variables selected and activity can be 
measured by claim data for each individual provider. The objective of the financial incentive 
both in theory and method is to reduce quality gaps.   
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Table 4 Study Design 
 
Dual Eligible MA PCP and MA patient information is de-identified in order to maintain 
provider and patient confidentiality. Claim filters for office based services are set so that only 
specific Dual Eligible claims are analyzed to capture quality gaps year-over-year for the study 
period. Claims for services outside of the office-based setting are removed from the sample such 
as those for Hospital-based, Emergency Room, and facility claims. Additionally, only services 
performed in an urban (i.e., Maricopa County) Arizona office-based setting are considered, so 
rural claim activity is excluded.  
Study Design
Dependent 
Variable:
Independent 
Variables:
Controls:
Total Dual 
Eligible 
Medicare 
Advantage 
HEDIS gaps 
(Numerator):
Dummy Data: Dual Eligible 
MA PCP 
Structures:
Dual Eligible 
MA PCP 
Specialties:
Dual Eligible 
MA PCP 
Practice Size:
Dual Eligible 
MA PCP 
Gender:
Premium 
Designation
1) Breast 
Cancer 
Screening
Prefinancial 
Incentive (2010-
2011)
1) Single 
Specialty
1) Family 
Practice
Count of Dual 
MA PCPs within 
practice
Female = 1 Yes = 1
2) Colorectal 
Cancer 
Screening
Financial 
Incentive (2013-
2014)
2) Multispecialty 2) General 
Practice
3) Blood Sugar 
Screening
Transition Period 
(2012) excluded
3) Federally 
Qualified Health 
Center
3) Internal 
Medicine
4) Eye Exam 
Screening
4) Patient 
Centered 
Medical Home
4) Nurse 
Practitioner
5) Kidney 
Disease 
Screening
5) Physician 
Assistant
Dual Eligible 
Medicare 
Advantage 
patients assigned 
(Denominator)
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III.1 Single Specialty (Structure) 
Single Specialty Dual Eligible MA PCPs that care for the MA patients, offer their 
services to the aging population many of which may have increased demands due to complex 
chronic care conditions, such as Cancer and Diabetes. They are often required to coordinate care 
outside of their practice. Dual Eligible MA PCP patient panels continue to grow year-over-year 
in the Dual Eligible segment and the providers servicing them have struggled to keep pace with 
growth. Between 2011 and 2013, for example, three thousand five hundred and seventeen 
(3,517) UHC Dual Eligible MA patient assignments grew to six thousand nineteen (6,019) in 
Maricopa County, Arizona alone for the Single Specialty Dual Eligible MA PCP network. This 
assignment represents an average Dual Eligible growth rate of seventy one percent (71%) over 
pre-financial incentive enrollment period (See Appendix B. Descriptive Data – Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Structures, p. 75).            
III.2 Multispecialty (Structure) 
Certain Dual Eligible MA PCP practices have found success with combining their 
practice with specialized care divisions. In the Dual Eligible MA PCP landscape, where care 
often involves complex coordination of benefits, this structure is very popular. A Multispecialty 
approach has the benefit of owning the care of the patient with little need to refer the patient 
outside of their practice.  
In Arizona, patient assignments for the Multispecialty Dual Eligible MA PCP network, in 
2011 assignments increased from four thousand seven hundred and seventy four (4,774) to ten 
thousand six hundred and sixty one (10,661) in 2013 resulting in a one hundred and twenty three 
percent (123%) increase over pre-financial incentive enrollment period. (See Appendix B. 
Descriptive Data – Dual Eligible MA PCP Structures, p. 75).     
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III.3 Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHC) (Structure) 
This structure came about in the 1990s to meet the demands of expanding patient 
populations with primary care quality specifically in mind. This provider type is federally funded 
by the Social Security Act. It is unique in that it provides physician services for at-risk 
populations from a community benefit perspective. The Dual Eligible MA PCPs in this structure 
offer enhanced services to the Dual Eligible MA population in underserved areas. This is 
extremely beneficial for the patients that need expanded services, such as eye care, dental 
services, and, or hearing services, which the FQHCs must provide based on requirements.  
The designation as an FQHC is open to both Single Specialty and Multispecialty Dual 
Eligible MA PCPs who meet specific regulatory requirements. In Arizona, FQHC designated 
Dual Eligible MA PCP network for both segments witnessed patient assignment growth from 
2011 with three thousand eight hundred and sixty five (3,865) Dual Eligible MA patients to five 
thousand seven hundred and fifty seven (5,757) Dual Eligible MA patients in 2013 resulting in a 
growth rate of forty nine percent (49%)  (See Appendix B. Descriptive Data – Dual Eligible MA 
PCP Structures, p. 75).      
III.4 Patient-centered Medical Home (PCMH) 
These distinct structures are a transformation of the clinic setting that offer Clinical Case 
Management (CCM) to provide an enhanced benefit to ensure quality and collaboration in the 
Total Care Management approach for the Dual Eligible MA patient population. This structure 
allows for strategic patient-centered focus. While it seems that this structure is growing in 
popularity, not enough information was present for analysis during the study period, and this area 
of focus can be the topic for future research.      
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III.5 Independent and Control Variables 
Dummy (Independent) variables for pre-financial incentive and financial incentive 
periods are used to separate the data. Controls at the individual provider level are assigned for 
Single Specialty, Multispecialty, FQHC, and PCMH structures. Family Practice, General 
Practice, Internal Medicine, Nurse Practitioner, and Physician Assistant specialty variables are 
assigned at the individual level as well. Additional controls for Gender, Size identified by 
provider count, and Premium Designation are also added for analysis before and after financial 
incentive implementation.  
III.6 Dependent Variable (DV)  
The following five (5) HEDIS quality gap measures, namely (1) Breast Cancer 
Screening, (2) Colorectal Cancer Screening, (3) Blood Sugar (HbA1c) Screening, (4) Eye Exam 
Screening, and (5) Kidney Disease Screening are selected per review of financial incentive 
criteria specifically applicable to the Dual Eligible MA population. Selection is also based on 
claim data available for the periods under review. While other HEDIS measures exist, the data 
available relate to verifiable gaps in this study period for the measures selected. Other measures, 
such as those pertaining to pediatric, obstetric/gynecologic and pharmacy services, are beyond 
the scope of this study and therefore excluded.    
The measures selected for analysis are at the individual provider level; furthermore, these 
measures receive focused attention since gap closure in these areas have a significant impact on 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality, and ultimately, on the cost of care. The total gaps identified will 
represent the numerator in the analysis. The denominator will consist of total Dual Eligible MA 
patients assigned. Also, the denominator for Breast Cancer Screening is adjusted to only include 
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female Dual Eligible MA patients. The various Dual Eligible MA patient counts are at the 
individual provider level.  
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IV ANALYSIS AND RESULTS (BEFORE AND AFTER FINANCIAL INCENTIVE 
PERIOD) 
T-Test analysis of pre-financial incentive and financial incentive periods was conducted 
to measure the averages of the quality gap rates year-over-year controlling for the variables per 
the study design using SPSS Statistics 24. Regression analysis was also done to further test the 
extent to which quality is improving or not in the financial incentive period. Analysis was further 
done to determine if structures, specialty, and gender were predictive indicators of quality.   
IV.1 T-Test (before and after Financial Incentive period) 
H1: HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates for Single Specialty, 
Multispecialty, and FQHC Structures decreased, i.e., improved quality care, in the 
financial incentive period.  
An independent-samples T-Test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that HEDIS 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates decreased in the financial incentive period. The mean 
HEDIS financial incentive period Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gaps per Structures are as 
follows: 
Single Specialty Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.094, sd = 1.107) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -4.175, df = 1895.257, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive Single Specialty gap rate mean (M = 1.861, sd = 
1.33). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Single Specialty Dual 
Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive period and, in fact, 
evidence that quality was worse after financial incentives were implemented. 
Multispecialty Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.084., sd = 1.205.) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -6.237, df = 3076.386, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
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Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive Multispecialty quality gap rate mean (M = 1.818., 
sd = 1.178.). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Multispecialty 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive period and, in 
fact, evidence that quality was worse after financial incentives were implemented.  
FQHC Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.067, sd = 1.196) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -4.201, df = 2016.063, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive FQHC gap rate mean (M = 1.833, sd = 1.317). 
This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the FQHC Dual Eligible MA 
PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that 
quality was worse after financial incentives were implemented (Details in Appendix C. T-Test 
(before and after Financial Incentive period), p. 80, adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008).     
H2: M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General Practice, and Internal Medicine) and 
Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and Physician Assistant) Specialty Dual Eligible MA PCP 
quality gap rates improved in the financial incentive period. 
An independent-samples T-Test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that HEDIS 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates decreased in the financial incentive period. The mean 
HEDIS financial incentive period Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gaps per Specialty are as 
follows: 
Family Practice Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.066, sd = 1.134) 
was statistically significantly different (t = -4.07, df = 2066.492, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that 
of Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive Family Practice gap rate mean (M = 1.856, sd 
= 1.208). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Family Practice 
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Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive period and, in 
fact, evidence that quality was worse after financial incentives were implemented.  
General Practice Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.549, sd = 1.176) 
was statistically significantly different (t = -4.038, df = 125.048, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that 
of Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive General Practice gap rate mean (M = 1.794, sd 
= 0.961). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the General Practice 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive period and, in 
fact, evidence that quality was worse after financial incentives were implemented. 
Internal Medicine Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.052, sd = 1.175) 
was statistically significantly different (t = -3.062, df = 1308.563, two-tailed p = 0.002) from that 
of Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive Internal Medicine gap rate mean (M = 1.845, 
sd = 1.28). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Internal 
Medicine Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive 
period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse after financial incentives were implemented. 
Nurse Practitioner Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.254, sd = 1.201) 
was statistically significantly different (t = -4.665, df = 578.99, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive Nurse Practitioner gap rate mean (M = 1.775, sd = 
1.278). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Nurse Practitioner 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive period and, in 
fact, evidence that quality was worse after financial incentives were implemented.  
Physician Assistant Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.016, sd = 
1.214) was statistically significantly different (t = -2.347, df = 891.035, two-tailed p = 0.019) 
from that of Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive Physician Assistant gap rate mean (M 
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= 1.819, sd = 1.287). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the 
Physician Assistant Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial 
incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse after financial incentives were 
implemented (Details in Appendix C. – T-Test (before and after Financial Incentive period), p. 
80, adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008). 
H3: Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates will be lower in the financial 
incentive period. 
An independent-samples T-Test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that HEDIS 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates decreased in the financial incentive period. The mean 
HEDIS financial incentive period Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gaps for Gender are as follows: 
Male Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.177, sd = 1.182) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -7.591, df = 2689.625, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive Male gap rate mean (M = 1.829, sd = 1.196). This 
implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Male Dual Eligible MA PCP 
quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive period.  
Female Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 1.984, sd = 1.152) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -2.761, df = 2282.338, two-tailed p = 0.006) from that of 
Dual Eligible MA PCP pre-financial incentive Female gap rate mean (M = 1.843, sd = 1.296). 
This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Female Dual Eligible MA 
PCP quality gap rate did not improve in the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that 
quality was worse after financial incentives were implemented (Details in Appendix C. – T-Test 
(before and after Financial Incentive period), p. 80, adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008). 
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Specific Dual Eligible MA PCP HEDIS quality data for the observable periods have been 
analyzed and compared.  Pre-financial incentive and financial incentive period analysis (See 
Table 5. Summary of Findings. T-Test below) identifying the practice data across the periods.   
Table 5 Summary of Findings. T-Test before and after Financial Incentive period 
Hypotheses   T-Test Results 
H1 
(Structure) 
HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality 
gap rates for Single Specialty, 
Multispecialty, and FQHC Structures 
decreased, i.e., improved quality care, in 
the financial incentive period.  
 
 
Not 
supported 
  
 
 Single Specialty 
 
Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.861) < 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.094) 
Failed to 
support  
 
 Multispecialty Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.818) < 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.084) 
Failed to 
support  
 
 FQHC Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.833) < 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.067) 
Failed to 
support  
 
H2 
(Specialty) 
M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General 
Practice, and Internal Medicine) and 
Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and 
Physician Assistant) Specialty Dual 
Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates 
improved in the financial incentive 
period. 
 
Not 
supported 
  
 
 Family Practice (M.D.) Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.856) < 
Failed to 
support  
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Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.066) 
 General Practice (M.D.) Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.794) < 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.549) 
Failed to 
support  
 
 Internal Medicine (M.D.) Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.845) < 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.052) 
Failed to 
support  
 
 Nurse Practitioner (Midlevel) Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.775) < 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.254) 
Failed to 
support  
 
 Physician Assistant (Midlevel) Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.819) < 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.016) 
Failed to 
support  
 
H3 
(Gender) 
Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP gap 
rates will be lower in the financial 
incentive period. 
 Not 
supported 
 
 Female Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.843) < 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.984) 
Failed to 
support 
 
Male Dual Eligible MA PCP 
Pre-Financial 
Incentive Gap Rate 
Mean (1.829) < 
Financial Incentive 
Failed to 
support 
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Gap Rate Mean 
(2.177) 
    
IV.2 Correlation 
A set of Pearson correlations were computed to determine if there were any significant 
relationships between the variables in this study, i.e., at, or greater than 0.70 Pearson Correlation 
suggesting common variability, and at, or below 0.20 suggesting little or no common variability. 
Cases of significant correlations are identified in Appendix D and shaded in gray. Multispecialty 
and Single Specialty are perfectly, negatively correlated suggesting they move in opposite 
directions. Structures indicates a strong negative relationship based on the unique characteristics 
of each resulting in the perfect negative correlation. Also, Dual Eligible MA PCP options fall 
within these two categories.  
Other noted variables with high correlation are Blood Sugar and Eye Exam Screening. 
This is also not surprising since these measures, controlling for Dual Eligible MA PCP patient 
assignment, move positively within the screening regimen. These HEDIS measures are also 
positively tied to their Diabetic grouping (See Appendix D – Correlation, p. 89).     
IV.3  Regression (before and after Financial Incentive period) 
The following results were obtained per multiple regression analysis performed on 
quality controlling for patients assigned as the dependent variable to test r squared and effect size 
of controlling variables, namely structure, specialty, and gender. Using SPSS to analyze HEDIS 
quality over time, multiple regression was used to fit data into the model.  
H1: HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates for Single Specialty, 
Multispecialty, and FQHC Structures decreased, i.e., improved quality care, in the 
financial incentive period.    
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From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Single Specialty structure r square and 
adjusted r square values are 0.298 and 0.294 and account for approximately twenty-nine percent 
(29%) of variability in the model. The controls within this structure do not appear to be strong 
predictors of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); this also further 
supports the T-Test finding that Dual Eligible MA PCP financial incentive period quality has not 
improved. Premium Designation, a designation added to providers to reflect high levels of 
patient satisfaction, added to the analysis was significant however (b = -1.519, p = 0.000) in the 
model as a predictor of lower gaps. This variable is added to the multivariate analysis and 
measures patient satisfaction of the Dual Eligible MA PCP which is determined annually per 
survey results.  
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Multispecialty structure r square and adjusted 
r square values are 0.426 and 0.424 and account for approximately forty-two percent (42%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this structure do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was 
significant however (b = -1.724, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. This also 
further supports the T-Test finding that Multispecialty Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates did not 
improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse.   
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, FQHC structure r square and adjusted r 
square values are 0.334 and 0.332 and account for approximately thirty-three percent (33%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this structure do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was 
significant however (b = -1.659, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. This also 
further supports the T-Test finding that Dual Eligible MA PCP financial incentive period gap 
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rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was 
worse (See Appendix E. Regression Results (before and after Financial Incentive period), p. 92. 
Adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008).   
H2: M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General Practice, and Internal Medicine) and 
Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and Physician Assistant) Specialty Dual Eligible MA PCP 
quality gap rates improved in the financial incentive period. 
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Family Practice specialty r square and 
adjusted r square values are 0.350 and 0.348 and account for approximately thirty-five percent 
(35%) of variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong 
predictors of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation 
was significant however (b = -1.579, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. This 
also further supports the T-Test finding that Family Practice Dual Eligible MA PCP financial 
incentive period gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, 
evidence that quality was worse.   
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, General Practice specialty r square and 
adjusted r square values are 0.448 and 0.421 and account for approximately forty-two percent 
(42%) of variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong 
predictors of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation 
was significant however (b = -1.329, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. 
Multispecialty and Gender were also significant predictors of quality both with low p-values (p < 
0.05). From a Dual Eligible MA PCP standpoint General Practice specialty do seem to improve 
quality, but based on T-Test finding and relatively low effect sizes, it is not indicative that 
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General Practice Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive 
period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse within the financial incentive period.   
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Internal Medicine specialty r square and 
adjusted r square values are 0.388 and 0.385 and account for approximately thirty-eight percent 
(38%) of variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong 
predictors of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation 
was significant however (b = -1.704, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. This 
also further supports the T-Test finding that Internal Medicine Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates 
did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was 
worse.   
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Nurse Practitioner specialty r square and 
adjusted r square values are 0.401 and 0.394 and account for approximately thirty-nine percent 
(39%) of variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong 
predictors of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation 
was significant however (b = -1.653, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. This 
also further supports the T-Test finding that Nurse Practitioner Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates 
did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was 
worse.   
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Physician Assistant specialty r square and 
adjusted r square values are 0.394 and 0.389 and account for approximately thirty-nine percent 
(39%) of variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong 
predictors of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Gender (b = -0.136, p = 
0.043) and Premium Designation were significant however (b = -1.659, p = 0.000) in the model 
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as a predictors of lower gaps, but not to the extent that the financial incentive quality improved. 
This further supports the T-Test finding that Physician Assistant Dual Eligible MA PCP gap 
rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was 
worse (See Appendix E. Regression Results (before and after Financial Incentive period), p. 92. 
Adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008).   
H3: Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates will be lower in the financial 
incentive period. 
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Female Gender r square and adjusted r square 
values are 0.365 and 0.362 and account for approximately thirty-six percent (36%) of variability 
in the model. The controls within Female gender do not appear to be strong predictors of quality 
given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); interestingly and worth mentioning, 
Physician Assistant specialty (b = -0.132, p = 0.027) and Premium Designation are significant 
however (b = -1.672, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictors of lower gaps. These were not 
enough to reflect improvement, but do appear to be improving quality. This also further supports 
the T-Test finding that Female Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates did not improve within the 
financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse.   
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Male Gender r square and adjusted r square 
values are 0.382 and 0.38 and account for approximately thirty-eight percent (38%) of variability 
in the model. The controls within Male gender do not appear to be strong predictors of quality 
given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was significant 
however (b = -1.616, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. This also further 
supports the T-Test finding that Male Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates did not improve within 
the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse (See Table 6. 
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Summary of Findings. Regression below and Appendix E. Regression Results (before and after 
Financial Incentive period), p. 92. Adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008).  
Table 6 Summary of Findings. Regression before and after Financial Incentive period 
 
Hypotheses   Regression Results 
H1  HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap 
rates for Single Specialty, Multispecialty, 
and FQHC Structures decreased, i.e., 
improved quality care, in the financial 
incentive period.   
 
Not 
supported 
(Structure) Single Specialty Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.298 and 0.294  
(29% of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Structure) Multispecialty Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.426 and 0.424 (42% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Structure) FQHC Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.334 and 0.332 (33% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
 H2  M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General 
Practice, and Internal Medicine) and 
Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and 
Physician Assistant) Specialty Dual 
Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates 
improved in the financial incentive period. 
 Not 
supported 
(Specialty) Family Practice (M.D.)  Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square 
0.350 and 0.348 (35% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Specialty) General Practice (M.D.) Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.448 and 0.421 (42% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Specialty) Internal Medicine (M.D.) Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
Failed to 
support 
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0.388 and 0.385 (39% 
of variability) 
(Specialty) Nurse Practitioner (Midlevel) Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.401 and 0.394 (39% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Specialty) Physician Assistant (Midlevel) Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.394 and 0.389   
(39% of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
H3  Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP gap 
rates will be lower in the financial 
incentive period. 
 
Not 
supported 
(Gender) Female Dual Eligible MA 
PCP  r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.365 and 0.362 (36% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Gender) Male Dual Eligible MA 
PCP  r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.382 and 0.38 (38% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
    
 
Further analysis within the financial incentive period is done to determine the extent to 
which the financial incentives have on quality relative to structure, specialty, and gender. These 
analyses and the findings are presented below: 
V ANALYSIS AND RESULTS (WITHIN FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PERIOD ONLY) 
V.1 T-Test (within Financial Incentive period only) 
H1: HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates for Single Specialty, 
Multispecialty, and FQHC Structures decreased, i.e., improved quality care, in the 
financial incentive period. 
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An independent-samples t-test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that HEDIS 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates decreased in the financial incentive period. The mean 
HEDIS financial incentive period Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gaps per Structures are as 
follows: 
Single Specialty 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 1.898, sd = 1.167) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -5.168, df = 826.674, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
2014 Single Specialty Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.285, sd = 1.012). This 
implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Single Specialty Dual Eligible 
MA PCP quality gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, 
evidence that quality was worse in the financial incentive period.  
Multispecialty 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 1.861., sd = 1.253.) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -7.727, df = 1630.51, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
2014 Multispecialty Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.311., sd = 1.109.). 
This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Multispecialty Dual 
Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in 
fact, evidence that quality was worse in the financial incentive period.  
FQHC 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 1.892, sd = 1.26) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -4.493, df = 898.202, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
2014 FQHC Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.244, sd = 1.101). This implies 
evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the FQHC Dual Eligible MA PCP quality 
gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality 
was worse in the financial incentive period (Details in Appendix C. T-Test (within Financial 
Incentive period only, p. 86, adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008).     
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H2: M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General Practice, and Internal Medicine) and 
Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and Physician Assistant) Specialty Dual Eligible MA PCP 
quality gap rates improved in the financial incentive period. 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that 2013 
HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates decreased in 2014. The mean HEDIS financial 
incentive period Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gaps per Specialty are as follows: 
Family Practice Dual Eligible MA PCP 2013 quality gap rate mean (M = 1.827, sd = 
1.169) was statistically significantly different (t = -6.951, df = 1024.501, two-tailed p = 0.000) 
from that of 2014 Family Practice Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.305, sd = 
1.045). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Family Practice 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period 
and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse in the financial incentive period.  
General Practice 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.303, sd = 
1.327) was not statistically significantly different (t = -1.727, df = 64, two-tailed p = 0.089) from 
that of General Practice 2014 Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.795, sd = 0.962). 
This implies evidence suggesting that the General Practice Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap 
rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was 
flat or unchanged in the financial incentive period. 
Internal Medicine 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 1.865, sd = 
1.245) was statistically significantly different (t = -4.14, df = 643.542, two-tailed p = 0.000) from 
that of 2014 Internal Medicine Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.239, sd = 1.071). 
This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Internal Medicine Dual 
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Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in 
fact, evidence that quality was worse in the financial incentive period. 
Nurse Practitioner 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 2.012, sd = 
1.282) was statistically significantly different (t = -3.502, df = 279.013, two-tailed p = 0.001) 
from that of 2014 Dual Eligible MA PCP Nurse Practitioner gap rate mean (M = 2.496, sd = 
1.066). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Nurse Practitioner 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period 
and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse in the financial incentive period. 
Physician Assistant 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 1.843, sd = 
1.258) was statistically significantly different (t = -3.044, df = 442.327, two-tailed p = 0.002) 
from that of 2014 Dual Eligible MA PCP Physician Assistant gap rate mean (M = 2.189, sd = 
1.146). This implies evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Physician Assistant 
Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate did not improve within the financial incentive period 
and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse in the financial incentive period. (Details in 
Appendix C. T-Test (within Financial Incentive period only, p. 86, adapted from Burns and 
Burns, 2008).       
H3:  Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates will be lower in the financial 
incentive period. 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that HEDIS 
Dual Eligible MA PCP 2013 quality gap rates decreased in 2014 for both genders. The mean 
HEDIS financial incentive period Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates per Gender are as 
follows: 
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Male 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 1.996, sd = 1.241) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -5.683, df = 1322.537, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
2014 Male Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.358, sd = 1.092). This implies evidence 
against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Male Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates did 
not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse in 
the financial incentive period. 
Female 2013 Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rate mean (M = 1.731, sd = 1.19) was 
statistically significantly different (t = -7.65, df = 1139.261, two-tailed p = 0.000) from that of 
2014 Female Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rate mean (M = 2.237, sd = 1.054). This implies 
evidence against the null hypothesis suggesting that the Female Dual Eligible MA PCP quality 
gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality 
was worse in the financial incentive period (Details in Appendix C. T-Test (within Financial 
Incentive period only, p. 86, adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008). Specific Dual Eligible MA 
PCP HEDIS quality data for the observable periods have been analyzed and compared. Financial 
incentive period analysis (See Table 7. Summary of Findings. T-Test (within Financial Incentive 
period only) below) identifying the data as follows:   
Table 7 Summary of Findings. T-Test within Financial Incentive period only 
Hypotheses   T-Test Results 
H1 
(Structure) 
HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality 
gap rates for Single Specialty, 
Multispecialty, and FQHC Structures 
decreased, i.e., improved quality care, 
in the financial incentive period. 
 
Not supported 
  
 
 Single Specialty 
 
2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.898) < 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Failed to 
support  
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Gap Rate Mean 
(2.285) 
 Multispecialty 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.861) < 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.311) 
Failed to 
support  
 
 FQHC 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.892) < 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.244) 
Failed to 
support  
 
H2 
(Specialty) 
M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General 
Practice, and Internal Medicine) and 
Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and 
Physician Assistant) Specialty Dual 
Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates 
improved in the financial incentive 
period. 
 
Not supported 
  
 
 Family Practice (M.D.) 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.827) < 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.305) 
Failed to 
support  
 
 General Practice (M.D.) 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.303) <= 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.795) 
Failed to 
support 
(unchanged) 
 
 Internal Medicine (M.D.) 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.865) < 2014 
Failed to 
support  
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Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.239) 
 Nurse Practitioner (Midlevel) 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.012) < 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.496) 
Failed to 
support  
 
 Physician Assistant (Midlevel) 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.843) < 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.189) 
Failed to 
support  
 
H3 
(Gender) 
Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP 
gap rates will be lower in the financial 
incentive period. 
 Not supported 
 Female 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.731) < 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.237) 
Failed to 
support 
 
Male 2013 Dual Eligible 
MA PCP Pre-
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(1.196) < 2014 
Financial Incentive 
Gap Rate Mean 
(2.358) 
Failed to 
support 
    
 
V.2 Regression (within Financial Incentive period only) 
The following results were obtained per multiple regression performed on quality 
controlling for patients assigned as the dependent variable to test r squared and effect size of 
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variables with respect to structure, specialty, and gender. Using SPSS to analyze HEDIS quality 
over time, multiple regression was used to fit data into the model.  
H1: HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap rates for Single Specialty, 
Multispecialty, and FQHC Structures decreased, i.e., improved quality care, in the 
financial incentive period.    
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Single Specialty structure r square and 
adjusted r square values are 0.479 and 0.474 and account for approximately forty-seven percent 
(47%) of variability in the model. The controls within this structure do not appear to be strong 
predictors of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation 
was significant however (b = -1.644, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. 
General Practice and Gender were also significant predictors in the analysis but at small effect 
sizes. This also further supports the T-Test finding that Single Specialty Dual Eligible MA PCP 
financial incentive period quality gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period 
and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse.   
From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, Multispecialty structure r square and adjusted 
r square values are 0.587 and 0.584 and account for approximately fifty-eight percent (58%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this structure do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was 
significant however (b = -1.984, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. FQHC and 
Size were significant predictors in the analysis as well but at small effect sizes. This also further 
supports the T-Test finding that Multispecialty Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates did not improve 
within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse.   
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From a Dual Eligible MA PCP perspective, FQHC structure r square and adjusted r 
square values are 0.564 and 0.56 and account for approximately fifty-six percent (56%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this structure do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was 
significant however (b = -1.953, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. Internal 
Medicine and Physician Assistant controls were significant in the analysis but at small effect 
sizes. This also further supports the T-Test finding that FQHC Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates 
did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was 
worse (See Appendix E. Regression (within Financial Incentive period only), p. 108. Adapted 
from Burns and Burns, 2008).  
H2: M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General Practice, and Internal Medicine) and 
Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and Physician Assistant) Specialty quality gap rates 
improved in the financial incentive period. 
From a Dual Eligible MA perspective, Family Practice specialty r square and adjusted r 
square values are 0.509 and 0.506 and account for approximately fifty-one percent (51%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was 
significant however (b = -1.81, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. Single 
Specialty and Size were significant in the analysis as well but at small effect sizes. This also 
further supports the T-Test finding that Family Practice Dual Eligible MA financial incentive 
period quality gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, 
evidence that quality was worse.   
 51 
From a Dual Eligible MA perspective, General Practice specialty r square and adjusted r 
square values are 0.527 and 0.479 and account for approximately forty-eight percent (48%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was 
significant however (b = -1.56, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. 
Multispecialty and Gender were significant predictors of quality both with low p-values (p < 
0.05) but at small effect sizes. Single Specialty was also significant in the analysis but at small 
effect size as well. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong predictors of 
quality given small effect size and high p-values (p>0.05). This also further supports the T-Test 
finding that General Practice Dual Eligible MA financial incentive period quality gap rates did 
not improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse.   
From a Dual Eligible MA perspective, Internal Medicine specialty r square and adjusted r 
square values are 0.544 and 0.539 and account for approximately fifty-four percent (54%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was 
significant however (b = -1.887, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. This also 
further supports the T-Test finding that Internal Medicine Dual Eligible MA gap rates did not 
improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse    
From a Dual Eligible MA perspective, Nurse Practitioner specialty r square and adjusted 
r square values are 0.595 and 0.586 and account for approximately fifty-nine percent (59%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was 
significant however (b = -1.924, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. This also 
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further supports the T-Test finding that Nurse Practitioner Dual Eligible MA gap rates did not 
improve within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse    
From a Dual Eligible MA perspective, Physician Assistant specialty r square and adjusted 
r square values are 0.613 and 0.608 and account for approximately sixty-one percent (61%) of 
variability in the model. The controls within this specialty do not appear to be strong predictors 
of quality given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Gender (b = -.163, p = 0.028) and 
Premium Designation were significant however (b = -2.007, p = 0.000) in the model as a 
predictors of lower gaps, but not to the extent that the financial incentive quality improved. 
Multispecialty and Size were also significant in the analysis but at small effect size. This further 
supports the T-Test finding that Physician Assistant Dual Eligible MA gap rates did not improve 
within the financial incentive period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse (See Appendix 
E – Regression Results, p. 108. Adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008).   
H3: Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP gap rates will be lower in the financial 
incentive period. 
From a Dual Eligible MA perspective, Female Gender r square and adjusted r square 
values are 0.547 and 0.543 and account for approximately fifty-four percent (54%) of variability 
in the model. The controls within Female Gender do not appear to be strong predictors of quality 
given small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); interestingly and worth mentioning, 
Physician Assistant specialty (b = -0.188, p = 0.005) and Premium Designation are significant 
however (b = -1.889, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictors of lower gaps. FQHC and Size were 
also significant in the analysis but at small effect sizes. This also further supports the T-Test 
finding that Female Dual Eligible MA gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive 
period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse.   
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From a Dual Eligible MA perspective, Male Gender r square and adjusted r square values 
are 0.548 and 0.545 and account for approximately fifty-five percent (55%) of variability in the 
model. The controls within this gender do not appear to be strong predictors of quality given 
small effect size and high p-values (p > 0.05); Premium Designation was significant however (b 
= -1.86, p = 0.000) in the model as a predictor of lower gaps. Multispecialty and General Practice 
were significant in the analysis but at small effect size. This also further supports the T-Test 
finding that Male Dual Eligible MA gap rates did not improve within the financial incentive 
period and, in fact, evidence that quality was worse (See Table 8. Summary of Findings. 
Regression (within Financial Incentive period only) below and Appendix E – Regression 
Results, p. 109. Adapted from Burns and Burns, 2008).  
Table 8 Summary of Findings. Regression within Financial Incentive period only 
Hypotheses   Regression Results 
H1  HEDIS Dual Eligible MA PCP quality gap 
rates for Single Specialty, Multispecialty, 
and FQHC Structures decreased, i.e., 
improved quality care, in the financial 
incentive period.   
 
Not 
supported 
(Structure) Single Specialty Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.479 and 0.474  
(47% of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Structure) Multispecialty Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.587 and 0.584 (58% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Structure) FQHC Dual Eligible MA 
PCP  r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.564 and 0.56 (56% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
 H2  M.D. (i.e., Family Practice, General 
Practice, and Internal Medicine) and 
Midlevel (i.e., Nurse Practitioner and 
Physician Assistant) Specialty Dual 
 Not 
supported 
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Eligible MA quality gap rates improved in 
the financial incentive period. 
(Specialty) Family Practice (M.D.)  Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square 
0.509 and 0.506 (51% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Specialty) General Practice (M.D.) Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.527 and 0.479 (48% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Specialty) Internal Medicine (M.D.) Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.544 and 0.539 (54% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Specialty) Nurse Practitioner (Midlevel) Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.595 and 0.586 (59% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Specialty) Physician Assistant (Midlevel) Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.613 and 0.608   
(61% of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
H3  Both Gender Dual Eligible MA PCP gap 
rates will be lower in the financial 
incentive period. 
 
Not 
supported 
(Gender) Female Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.547 and 0.543 (54% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
(Gender) Male Dual Eligible MA 
PCP r square and 
adjusted r square  
0.548 and 0.545 (55% 
of variability) 
Failed to 
support 
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VI  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: IMPLICATIONS 
Given the results of this study, the analyses suggest Dual Eligible MA gap rates are 
increasing for structures, specialties, and gender.  This additionally indicates financial incentives 
do not result in improved quality. With room for improvement, some interesting albeit 
concerning findings were identified. The average Dual Eligible MA patient growth rates in the 
financial incentive period were very high across structures, specialties, and gender with some 
well above two hundred percent (200%) (See Appendix B. Descriptive Data – Dual Eligible MA 
PCP Specialties, p. 80). This is problematic for the Dual Eligible MA PCPs especially 
considering the difficult population they serve. Further analysis is recommended to look at other 
HEDIS quality measures since this study is limited to five (5) measures leaving room to expand 
the research to include all 16 HEDIS measures as part of more comprehensive financial incentive 
program evaluation.  
An interesting finding relative to female providers also stood out. The number of female 
patients assigned to structures and specialties is significant. For instance, in 2014, the Female 
Dual Eligible MA patient percentage for structures hovers between sixty-seven percent (67%) 
and seventy-two percent (72%); for specialties the range is between forty percent (40%) and 
sixty-three percent (63%) (See Appendix B. Descriptive Data, pp. 75-80). While there could be 
further investigation to determine the growth trend of Females as Dual Eligible MA PCPs, 
valuable literature has come to the forefront that speaks to Females in the PCP landscape. 
Literature by Hoff (2009) suggests,  
“In a primary care world where patients are sicker, have multiple chronic 
conditions, experience fragmented care through a myriad of individual specialists, 
and suffer from behavioral disorders in vast numbers, the best clinicians nurture, 
dialogue, and connect with patients on an emotional level. The research says that 
women primary care physicians are more likely to have the mix of personality and 
motivation to meet this demand. Women are the future face of primary care” (Hoff, 
p. 133).  
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Additionally, Female Dual Eligible MA PCPs have lower quality gap rates compared to 
the Males within the financial incentive period (See Table 9. Dual Eligible MA PCP Gap Rates 
2010-2014 below). Given this finding, additional research should also examine the possible 
inter-relationship between the patients’ gender and the care providers’ gender and its impact on 
quality care gaps.   
Table 9 Dual Eligible MA PCP Gender Gap Rate Analysis 
GENDER DUAL 
FEMALE PCP 
DUAL FEMALE 
PATIENTS 
TOTAL DUAL 
PATIENTS 
DUAL GAP 
RATE 
2010 579                                      
2,563  
                                  
3,601  
1.94 
2011 579                                      
2,476  
                                  
3,964  
1.75 
2013 579                                      
4,772  
                                  
7,109  
1.73 
2014 579                                      
4,203  
                                  
6,209  
2.24 
          
GENDER DUAL MALE 
PCP 
 DUAL FEMALE 
PATIENTS  
 TOTAL DUAL 
PATIENTS  
DUAL GAP 
RATE 
2010 674                                      
3,009  
                                  
4,359  
1.88 
2011 674                                      
2,720  
                                  
4,327  
1.79 
2013 674                                      
6,209  
                                  
9,571  
2.00 
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2014 674                              
5,327  
                                  
7,958  
2.36 
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VII DISCUSSION 
The analyses found that quality is not improving based on before and after Financial 
Incentive period analysis. Also, of note, relevant studies were reviewed in which the findings 
were mixed perhaps due to timing of the financial incentive, or how they were examined, i.e., 
difference in HEDIS measure selection. The topics of financial incentives and quality are 
relevant topics in healthcare today. Health plans striving to improve quality will only succeed 
with provider and patient support. Dual Eligible MA patient health benefits can suffer without 
attention to quality. From Single Specialty to Multispecialty practices, as well as providers 
designated as a Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHC) or Patient Centered Medical Homes 
(PCMH), each provider is under extreme pressure to improve quality and health plans are relying 
on their support. While health plans focus on the demands of CMS, they maintain open dialogue 
with Dual Eligible MA PCPs to ensure support and adherence to HEDIS quality measures. 
Integrated care with a patient-centered focus is not a new strategy but without the patient 
support, it suffers.            
Health plans motivate behavior in the form of financial incentives. Rice’s (2015) brief but 
succinct paper on physician quality sets the tone for today’s healthcare community. Performance 
is not where it should be. Gaining understanding of the problems providers face will lead to 
better approaches in closing gaps in care. While consideration and analysis of empirical evidence 
is valuable, there is still much that is hidden. Health plans are beginning to realize this as 
pressure for quality increases. As pressure for quality increases, motivational efforts may need to 
be re-evaluated. 
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Given the results obtained from this quantitative study that identify quality gap rates are 
increasing before and after and within the financial incentive periods, the Dual Eligible MA 
PCPs and health plans should look at new approaches to improving quality. An opportunity 
exists to do this and dive deeper into the qualitative aspects of the care providers which can 
further bring important elements to light. For example, a qualitative in-depth case study can 
shine light on the frustrations of the Dual Eligible MA PCP network in dealing with health plans; 
other control measures or study variables such as pharmacy measures not considered in this 
study may also be considered to gain further insight to better explain increasing quality gap rates.    
Dual Eligible MA PCPs rely heavily on connecting with patients. As panel size increases, it is evident that 
time awarded per patient must decrease. This might lead to lower quality, especially with patients who have 
complex health needs and multiple chronic conditions.  UHC is providing incentives to counteract this potential 
problem, but evidence suggests quality is not improving. The Dual Eligible MA PCP-Patient relationship is as 
important as treatment, and in some situations, much more important. A provider’s status in the Premium 
Designation program is important and how patients view their Dual Eligible MA PCP yields much benefit in the 
area of quality and provider motivation.  
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VIII FUTURE RESEARCH: NOW WHAT? CONTRIBUTIONS 
What is driving the increased HEDIS quality gaps? Further research, not limited to 
qualitative study, is needed to provide insight into this phenomenon. Most health plans such as 
UHC are poised to expand their understanding of what lies ahead and can benefit, for example, 
from setting up a piloted experiment with a control and test group. High level meetings on the 
topic of quality are not new. What is new is involvement by all impacted parties. Engaging the 
Dual Eligible MA PCPs to fully understand the changing landscape is an excellent start. Patient-
Centered Medical Homes hold much promise in the evolving landscape, and open the door for 
continued research and further discussion. 
Healthcare research is complex on many levels and offers great opportunities for those 
willing to expand their knowledge. Testing theories adds much value as well. The contribution to 
practice offers a shared path to evidence-based knowledge in a dynamic industry in which staff 
and students alike seek to further understand the complex, real healthcare world. While this study 
only scratches the surface, it does provide a useful practice-based approach to deliver on a 
particular area of interest. These individuals will benefit from these and other studies, but not 
unless they are willing to ask difficult questions and there is certainly room to ask. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Glossary of Key Terms 
(Terms with meaning and relevance) 
Accountable Care – Coordinated healthcare services tied to quality and cost of care.  
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) – The regulatory funding agency that 
oversees healthcare quality. 
Fee-for-Service contract - Contract that pays for services rendered after a claim is submitted by 
a provider for the service.  Historical reimbursement methodology used by health plans which 
are now moving toward Pay-for-Performance contracts. 
Gaps in care - In healthcare, this is the discrepancy between “what is” and “what should be.”  
For example, Dual Eligible MA PCPs have service gaps in meeting preventative health 
screenings of Medicare members.   
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) – Specific quality measures that 
are tracked per regulatory requirement to ensure compliance.   
Dual Eligible Medicare Advantage Plan (Medicaid) - This is a government healthcare 
program for individuals with limited income and resources.  
Medicare Advantage Plan – In healthcare terms, this refers to the Medicare replacement plan 
offered by select health plans for Medicare eligible recipients.  
Pay-for-Performance (P4P) - Providers are paid for meeting pre-established targets for 
healthcare services.  
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Value Based Purchasing (VBP) – Providers incentivized for performance based on 
achievement of measures. 
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Appendix B. Descriptive Data – Dual Eligible MA PCP Structures 
 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVES - 
STRUCTURES
 SINGLE SPECIALTY (SS) SINGLE SPECIALTY (SS) SINGLE SPECIALTY (SS) SINGLE SPECIALTY (SS)
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 522 227 43% 13,391                                
2011 523 227 43% 15,057                                
2013 420 185 44% 19,589                                
2014 433 192 44% 20,371                                
 MULTISPECIALTY (MS) MULTISPECIALTY (MS) MULTISPECIALTY (MS) MULTISPECIALTY (MS)
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 730 352 48% 18,231                                
2011 729 352 48% 20,334                                
2013 832 394 47% 36,799                                
2014 819 387 47% 37,329                                
SS - FQHC SS - FQHC SS - FQHC SS - FQHC
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 196 106 54% 4,935                                  
2011 197 106 54% 5,593                                  
2013 120 70 58% 5,567                                  
2014 123 72 59% 5,736                                  
 MS - FQHC MS - FQHC MS - FQHC MS - FQHC
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 373 202 54% 9,191                                  
2011 371 201 54% 10,427                                
2013 340 171 50% 14,447                                
2014 330 166 50% 14,549                                
 SS - PCMH SS - PCMH SS - PCMH SS - PCMH
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2013 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2014 9 4 44% 349
 MS - PCMH MS - PCMH MS - PCMH MS - PCMH
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2013 106 65 61% 4,869                                  
2014 105 64 61% 5,168                                  
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DESCRIPTIVES - 
STRUCTURES
 SINGLE SPECIALTY (SS) SINGLE SPECIALTY (SS) SINGLE SPECIALTY (SS)
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 7,369                                  1.95                                    
2011 7,680                                  1.77                                    74%
2013 14,023                                1.90                                    230%
2014 12,586                                2.29                                    -8%
 MULTISPECIALTY (MS) MULTISPECIALTY (MS) MULTISPECIALTY (MS)
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 9,460                                  1.87
2011 10,479                                1.77 76%
2013 23,020                                1.86 181%
2014 23,440                                2.31 -6%
SS - FQHC SS - FQHC SS - FQHC
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 2,432                                  1.91
2011 2,787                                  1.69 85%
2013 4,085                                  1.87 275%
2014 3,509                                  2.18 -9%
 MS - FQHC MS - FQHC MS - FQHC
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 4,719                                  1.89
2011 5,763                                  1.80 95%
2013 8,509                                  1.90 178%
2014 8,773                                  2.27 -5%
 SS - PCMH SS - PCMH SS - PCMH
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 N/A N/A
2011 N/A N/A
2013 N/A N/A
2014 220 2.55  
 MS - PCMH MS - PCMH MS - PCMH
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 N/A N/A
2011 N/A N/A
2013 3,154                                  1.88
2014 3,570                                  2.46 -3%
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Appendix B. Descriptive Data – Dual Eligible MA PCP Specialties 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVES - 
SPECIALTIES
 FAMILY PRACTICE FAMILY PRACTICE FAMILY PRACTICE FAMILY PRACTICE
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 519 227 44% 13,132                                
2011 519 227 44% 14,526                                
2013 520 228 44% 23,582                                
2014 520 227 44% 23,955                                
 
 GENERAL PRACTICE GENERAL PRACTICE GENERAL PRACTICE GENERAL PRACTICE
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 33 16 48% 894                                     
2011 33 16 48% 1,078                                  
2013 33 15 45% 1,716                                  
2014 33 15 45% 1,727                                  
 
 INTERNAL MEDICINE INTERNAL MEDICINE INTERNAL MEDICINE INTERNAL MEDICINE
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 330 134 41% 8,076                                  
2011 330 134 41% 9,412                                  
2013 330 133 40% 14,436                                
2014 330 133 40% 14,935                                
 
 NURSE PRACTITIONER NURSE PRACTITIONER NURSE PRACTITIONER NURSE PRACTITIONER
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 146 92 63% 3,694                                  
2011 146 92 63% 4,170                                  
2013 145 91 63% 6,525                                  
2014 145 92 63% 6,693                                  
 
 PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT
YEAR PCP COUNT FEMALE PCP FEMALE % ALL PATIENTS
2010 224 110 49% 5,826                                  
2011 224 110 49% 6,205                                  
2013 224 112 50% 10,129                                
2014 224 112 50% 10,390                                
 67 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVES - 
SPECIALTIES
 FAMILY PRACTICE FAMILY PRACTICE FAMILY PRACTICE FAMILY PRACTICE
YEAR DUAL PATIENTS DUAL PATIENT % DUAL FEMALE PATIENTS DUAL FEMALE PATIENT %
2010 3,297                                  24% 2,393                                     76%
2011 3,206                                  21% 2,056                                     65%
2013 6,947                                  28% 4,567                                     67%
2014 5,812                                  24% 3,895                                     67%
 GENERAL PRACTICE GENERAL PRACTICE GENERAL PRACTICE GENERAL PRACTICE
YEAR DUAL PATIENTS DUAL PATIENT % DUAL FEMALE PATIENTS DUAL FEMALE PATIENT %
2010 224                                     24% 157                                        73%
2011 289                                     24% 181                                        62%
2013 526                                     30% 313                                        60%
2014 437                                     25% 274                                        61%
 INTERNAL MEDICINE INTERNAL MEDICINE INTERNAL MEDICINE INTERNAL MEDICINE
YEAR DUAL PATIENTS DUAL PATIENT % DUAL FEMALE PATIENTS DUAL FEMALE PATIENT %
2010 1,901                                  23% 1,333                                     71%
2011 2,338                                  23% 1,406                                     64%
2013 4,128                                  28% 2,789                                     68%
2014 3,636                                  24% 2,477                                     68%
 NURSE PRACTITIONER NURSE PRACTITIONER NURSE PRACTITIONER NURSE PRACTITIONER
YEAR DUAL PATIENTS DUAL PATIENT % DUAL FEMALE PATIENTS DUAL FEMALE PATIENT %
2010 916                                     24% 644                                        74%
2011 1,040                                  23% 638                                        67%
2013 1,994                                  29% 1,336                                     70%
2014 1,678                                  25% 1,162                                     69%
 PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT
YEAR DUAL PATIENTS DUAL PATIENT % DUAL FEMALE PATIENTS DUAL FEMALE PATIENT %
2010 1,622                                  25% 1,045                                     76%
2011 1,418                                  21% 915                                        69%
2013 3,085                                  29% 1,976                                     66%
2014 2,604                                  25% 1,724                                     66%
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DESCRIPTIVES - 
SPECIALTIES
 FAMILY PRACTICE FAMILY PRACTICE FAMILY PRACTICE
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 7,069                                  1.93
2011 7,068                                  1.78 64%
2013 15,089                                1.83 209%
2014 14,647                                2.31 -8%
 GENERAL PRACTICE GENERAL PRACTICE GENERAL PRACTICE
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 451                                     1.88
2011 628                                     1.70 101%
2013 1,357                                  2.30 152%
2014 1,295                                  2.80 -10%
 INTERNAL MEDICINE INTERNAL MEDICINE INTERNAL MEDICINE
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 3,898                                  1.87
2011 5,193                                  1.81 84%
2013 8,950                                  1.86 189%
2014 8,935                                  2.24 -5%
 NURSE PRACTITIONER NURSE PRACTITIONER NURSE PRACTITIONER
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 1,907                                  1.87
2011 2,185                                  1.68 95%
2013 4,773                                  2.01 224%
2014 4,593                                  2.50 -5%
 PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT
YEAR TOTAL GAPS DUAL GAP RATE AVG DUAL GROWTH RATE
2010 3,504                                  1.91
2011 3,085                                  1.73 71%
2013 6,874                                  1.84 229%
2014 6,556                                  2.19 -6%
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Appendix C. T-Test (before and after Financial Incentive period) 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
T TEST
H1
SINGLE SPECIALTY
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 1045 1.861 1.330 0.041
1 853 2.094 1.107 0.038
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
SINGLE SPEC DUAL 
GAP RATE
Equal 
variances 
assumed
1.637 0.201 -4.099 1896 0.000
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-4.175 1895.257 0.000
SINGLE SPEC DUAL 
GAP RATE
t df Sig. (2-tailed)F Sig.
H1
MULTISPECIALTY
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 1459 1.818 1.178 0.031
1 1651 2.084 1.205 0.030
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
MULTISPEC DUAL 
GAP RATE
Equal 
variances 
assumed
12.221 0.000 -6.229 3108 0.000
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-6.237 3076.386 0.000
MULTISPEC DUAL 
GAP RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H1
FQHC
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 1135 1.833 1.317 0.039
1 913 2.067 1.196 0.040
FQHC DUAL GAP 
RATE
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
Equal 
variances 
assumed
1.038 0.308 -4.157 2046 0.000
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-4.201 2016.063 0.000
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
FQHC DUAL GAP 
RATE
H2
FAMILY PRACTICE (M.D.)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 1038 1.856 1.208 0.037
1 1039 2.066 1.134 0.035
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
FAMILY PRACTICE 
DUAL GAP RATE
Equal 
variances 
assumed
0.000 0.995 -4.070 2075 0.000
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-4.070 2066.492 0.000
FAMILY PRACTICE 
DUAL GAP RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H2
GENERAL PRACTICE (M.D.)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 66 1.794 0.961 0.118
1 66 2.549 1.176 0.145
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
GENERAL PRACTICE 
DUAL GAP RATE
Equal 
variances 
assumed
3.105 0.080 -4.038 130 0.000
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-4.038 125.048 0.000
GENERAL PRACTICE 
DUAL GAP RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
H2
INTERNAL MEDICINE (M.D.)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 660 1.845 1.280 0.050
1 660 2.052 1.175 0.046
INTERNAL MEDICINE 
DUAL GAP RATE
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
Equal 
variances 
assumed
0.383 0.536 -3.062 1318 0.002
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-3.062 1308.563 0.002
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
INTERNAL MEDICINE 
DUAL GAP RATE
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H2
NURSE PRACTITIONER (MIDLEVEL)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 292 1.775 1.278 0.075
1 291 2.254 1.201 0.070
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
NURSE 
PRACTITIONER DUAL 
GAP RATE
Equal 
variances 
assumed
1.178 0.278 -4.664 581 0.000
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-4.665 578.990 0.000
NURSE 
PRACTITIONER DUAL 
GAP RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
H2
PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT (MIDLEVEL)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 448 1.819 1.287 0.061
1 448 2.016 1.214 0.057
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
PHYSICIAN 
ASSISTANT DUAL GAP 
RATE
Equal 
variances 
assumed
2.093 0.148 -2.347 894 0.019
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-2.347 891.035 0.019
PHYSICIAN 
ASSISTANT DUAL GAP 
RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
 
 
 
H3
MALE
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 1346 1.829 1.196 0.033
1 1346 2.177 1.182 0.032
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
MALE DUAL GAP 
RATE
Equal 
variances 
assumed
6.129 0.013 -7.591 2690 0.000
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-7.591 2689.625 0.000
MALE DUAL GAP 
RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
H3
FEMALE
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0 1158 1.843 1.296 0.038
1 1158 1.984 1.152 0.034
FEMALE DUAL GAP 
RATE
Group Statistics
DUMMY_IV_POST1
Equal 
variances 
assumed
0.064 0.801 -2.761 2314 0.006
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-2.761 2282.338 0.006
FEMALE DUAL GAP 
RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
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Appendix C. T-Test (within Financial Incentive Period only) 
H1 
SINGLE SPECIALTY  
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H1 
MULTISPECIALTY 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H1 
FQHC 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 420 1.898 1.167 0.057
2014 433 2.285 1.012 0.049
Group Statistics
YEAR
SINGLE SPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE
Equal variances 
assumed
14.278 0.000 -5.179 851 0.000
Equal variances 
not assumed
-5.168 826.674 0.000
SINGLE SPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 832 1.861 1.253 0.043
2014 819 2.311 1.109 0.039
Group Statistics
YEAR
MULTISPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE
Equal variances 
assumed
22.355 0.000 -7.719 1649.000 0.000
Equal variances 
not assumed
-7.727 1630.510 0.000
df Sig. (2-tailed)
MULTISPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE
F Sig. t
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H2 
FAMILY PRACTICE (M.D.) 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H2 
GENERAL PRACTICE (M.D.) 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 460 1.892 1.260 0.059
2014 453 2.244 1.101 0.052
Group Statistics
YEAR
FQHC DUAL_GAP_RATE
Equal variances 
assumed
13.099 0.000 -4.489 911 0.000
Equal variances 
not assumed
-4.493 898.202 0.000
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
FQHC DUAL_GAP_RATE
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 520 1.827 1.169 0.051
2014 519 2.305 1.045 0.046
Group Statistics
YEAR
FP DUAL_GAP_RATE
Equal variances 
assumed
9.777 0.002 -6.950 1037 0.000
Equal variances 
not assumed
-6.951 1024.501 0.000
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
FP DUAL_GAP_RATE
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 33 2.303 1.327 0.231
2014 33 2.795 0.962 0.167
Group Statistics
YEAR
GP DUAL_GAP_RATE
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H2 
INTERNAL MEDICINE (M.D.) 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H2 
NURSE PRACTITIONER 
(MIDLEVEL) 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H2 
Equal variances 
assumed
6.959 0.010 -1.727 64 0.089
Equal variances 
not assumed
-1.727 58.347 0.089
GP DUAL_GAP_RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 330 1.865 1.245 0.069
2014 330 2.239 1.071 0.059
Group Statistics
YEAR
IM DUAL_GAP_RATE
Equal variances 
assumed
15.594 0.000 -4.140 658 0.000
Equal variances 
not assumed
-4.140 643.542 0.000
df Sig. (2-tailed)
IM DUAL_GAP_RATE
F Sig. t
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 145 2.012 1.282 0.106
2014 146 2.496 1.066 0.088
Group Statistics
YEAR
NP DUAL_GAP_RATE
Equal variances 
assumed
6.426 0.012 -3.504 289 0.001
Equal variances 
not assumed
-3.502 279.013 0.001
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
NP DUAL_GAP_RATE
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PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT 
(MIDLEVEL) 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H3 
MALE 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
H3 
FEMALE 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 224 1.843 1.258 0.084
2014 224 2.189 1.146 0.077
Group Statistics
YEAR
PA DUAL_GAP_RATE
Equal variances 
assumed
4.112 0.043 -3.044 446 0.002
Equal variances 
not assumed
-3.044 442.237 0.002
PA DUAL_GAP_RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 673 1.996 1.241 0.048
2014 673 2.358 1.092 0.042
Group Statistics
YEAR
MALE DUAL_GAP_RATE
Equal variances 
assumed
23.966 0.000 -5.683 1344 0.000
Equal variances 
not assumed
-5.683 1322.537 0.000
MALE DUAL_GAP_RATE
Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)F
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
2013 579 1.731 1.190 0.049
2014 579 2.237 1.054 0.044
Group Statistics
YEAR
FEMALE DUAL_GAP_RATE
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Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
  
Equal variances 
assumed
10.416 0.001 -7.650 1156 0.000
Equal variances 
not assumed
-7.650 1139.261 0.000
FEMALE DUAL_GAP_RATE
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
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Appendix D. Correlation 
 
PREMIUM_
DESIGNATION_
YES1
DUMMY_IV_
POST1
SS1_SINGLE
_SPECIALTY
_
STRUCTURE
_CONTROL
MS2_
MULTISPECIALTY
_STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
FQ3_FQHC_
STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
PC4_PCMH_
STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_
YES1
 1 -.059
** 0.021 -0.021 0.014 -0.013
DUMMY_IV_POST1  -.059
** 1 -.079
**
.079
**
-.091
**
.214
**
SS1_SINGLE_SPECIALTY_
STRUCTURE_CONTROL
 0.021 -.079
** 1 -1.000
**
-.118
**
-.149
**
MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_
STRUCTURE_CONTROL
 -0.021 .079
**
-1.000
** 1 .118
**
.149
**
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
 0.014 -.091
**
-.118
**
.118
** 1 -.178
**
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
 -0.013 .214
**
-.149
**
.149
**
-.178
** 1
FP1_FAMILY_PRACTICE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 .038
** 0.000 .180
**
-.180
**
-.168
**
-.054
**
GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -.030
* 0.000 .044
**
-.044
**
-.066
**
.056
**
IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -0.008 0.000 .058
**
-.058
** -0.005 0.027
NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -.030
* -0.001 -.105
**
.105
**
.109
**
.041
**
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -0.001 0.000 -.228
**
.228
**
.158
** -0.019
GENDER_F1_CONTROL  0.022 0.000 -.039
**
.039
**
.119
**
.061
**
BCS/TOTAL_DUAL_ADJ_FOR_
FEMALE
 -.339
**
.156
** 0.000 0.000 -0.022 .037
**
CCS/TOTAL_DUAL  -.447
**
-.059
** 0.025 -0.025 0.009 -0.017
BSS/TOTAL_DUAL  -.522
**
-.117
** 0.017 -0.017 0.004 -0.005
EES/TOTAL_DUAL  -.523
**
.056
** -0.009 0.009 -0.018 .029
*
KDS/TOTAL_DUAL  -.480
**
.510
**
-.041
**
.041
**
-.059
**
.137
**
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FP1_FAMILY_
PRACTICE_
SPECIALTY_
CONTROL
GP2_GENERAL_
PRACTICE_
SPECIALTY_
CONTROL
IM3_INTERNAL
_MEDICINE_
SPECIALTY_
CONTROL
NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY 
(CONTROL)
PA5_
PHYSICIAN_
ASSISTANT_
SPECIALTY_
CONTROL
GENDER_F1_
CONTROL
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_
YES1
 .038
**
-.030
* -0.008 -.030
* -0.001 0.022
DUMMY_IV_POST1  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
SS1_SINGLE_SPECIALTY_
STRUCTURE_CONTROL
 .180
**
.044
**
.058
**
-.105
**
-.228
**
-.039
**
MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_
STRUCTURE_CONTROL
 -.180
**
-.044
**
-.058
**
.105
**
.228
**
.039
**
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
 -.168
**
-.066
** -0.005 .109
**
.158
**
.119
**
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
 -.054
**
.056
** 0.027 .041
** -0.019 .061
**
FP1_FAMILY_PRACTICE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 1 -.139
**
-.504
**
-.306
**
-.393
**
-.042
**
GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -.139
** 1 -.098
**
-.060
**
-.077
** 0.002
IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -.504
**
-.098
** 1 -.217
**
-.279
**
-.069
**
NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -.306
**
-.060
**
-.217
** 1 -.169
**
.122
**
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -.393
**
-.077
**
-.279
**
-.169
** 1 .031
*
GENDER_F1_CONTROL  -.042
** 0.002 -.069
**
.122
**
.031
* 1
BCS/TOTAL_DUAL_ADJ_FOR_
FEMALE
 0.007 0.018 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011
CCS/TOTAL_DUAL  -0.003 .033
* 0.010 -0.008 -0.015 -.030
*
BSS/TOTAL_DUAL  -0.002 0.021 -0.010 0.024 -0.015 -.032
*
EES/TOTAL_DUAL  -0.007 0.020 -0.013 0.021 -0.002 -.031
*
KDS/TOTAL_DUAL  0.000 .032
* -0.015 .031
* -0.022 -.037
**
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BCS_TOTAL_
DUAL_ADJ_
FOR_FEMALE
CCS_TOTAL
_DUAL
BSS/TOTAL_
DUAL
EES/TOTAL_
DUAL
KDS/TOTAL_
DUAL
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_
YES1
 -.339
**
-.447
**
-.522
**
-.523
**
-.480
**
DUMMY_IV_POST1  .156
**
-.059
**
-.117
**
.056
**
.510
**
SS1_SINGLE_SPECIALTY_
STRUCTURE_CONTROL
 0.000 0.025 0.017 -0.009 -.041
**
MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_
STRUCTURE_CONTROL
 0.000 -0.025 -0.017 0.009 .041
**
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
 -0.022 0.009 0.004 -0.018 -.059
**
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_
CONTROL
 .037
** -0.017 -0.005 .029
*
.137
**
FP1_FAMILY_PRACTICE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 0.000
GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 0.018 .033
* 0.021 0.020 .032
*
IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -0.003 0.010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.015
NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -0.008 -0.008 0.024 0.021 .031
*
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_
SPECIALTY_CONTROL
 -0.006 -0.015 -0.015 -0.002 -0.022
GENDER_F1_CONTROL  -0.011 -.030
*
-.032
*
-.031
*
-.037
**
BCS/TOTAL_DUAL_ADJ_FOR_
FEMALE
 1 .467
**
.333
**
.356
**
.337
**
CCS/TOTAL_DUAL  .467
** 1 .523
**
.472
**
.292
**
BSS/TOTAL_DUAL  .333
**
.523
** 1 .806
**
.480
**
EES/TOTAL_DUAL  .356
**
.472
**
.806
** 1 .621
**
KDS/TOTAL_DUAL  .337
**
.292
**
.480
**
.621
** 1
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Appendix E. Regression Results (before and after Financial Incentive period) 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
 
H1
SINGLE SPECIALTY
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .546
a 0.298 0.294 1.041 0.298 80.156 10 1887 0.000 1.816
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 869.427 10 86.943 80.156 .000
b
Residual 2046.780 1887 1.085
Total 2916.207 1897
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: SINGLE SPEC DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY 
(CONTROL), IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: SINGLE SPEC DUAL GAP RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
a. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
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a. Dependent Variable: SINGLE SPEC DUAL GAP RATE 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.047 0.063 48.582 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.519 0.055 -0.535 -27.541 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.186 0.049 0.074 3.819 0.000
GP2_GENERAL_P
RACTICE_SPECIA
0.186 0.132 0.028 1.406 0.160
IM3_INTERNAL_M
EDICINE_SPECIAL
-0.039 0.055 -0.014 -0.700 0.484
NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER 
-0.056 0.099 -0.012 -0.568 0.570
PA5_PHYSICIAN_A
SSISTANT_SPECIA
-0.022 0.106 -0.004 -0.204 0.839
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
0.004 0.008 0.023 0.584 0.559
GENDER_F1_CON
TROL
-0.090 0.050 -0.036 -1.824 0.068
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
H1
MULTISPECIALTY
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .653
a 0.426 0.424 0.910 0.426 230.055 10 3099 0.000 1.827
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 1905.342 10 190.534 230.055 .000
b
Residual 2566.630 3099 0.828
Total 4471.972 3109
RModel
Model Summaryb
Durbin-
Watson
Change Statistics
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Adjusted 
R SquareR Square
b. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), 
IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: MULTISPEC DUAL GAP RATE
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: MULTISPEC DUAL GAP RATE
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a. Dependent Variable: MULTISPEC DUAL GAP RATE 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.167 0.049 64.869 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.724 0.037 -0.642 -46.988 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.135 0.034 0.056 3.977 0.000
GP2_GENERAL_P
RACTICE_SPECIA
LTY_CONTROL
-0.107 0.117 -0.013 -0.913 0.361
IM3_INTERNAL_M
EDICINE_SPECIAL
TY_CONTROL
-0.073 0.043 -0.026 -1.686 0.092
NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY 
(CONTROL)
-0.024 0.052 -0.007 -0.456 0.649
PA5_PHYSICIAN_A
SSISTANT_SPECIA
LTY_CONTROL
-0.078 0.043 -0.028 -1.797 0.072
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
0.004 0.002 0.049 1.507 0.132
GENDER_F1_CON
TROL
-0.046 0.033 -0.019 -1.382 0.167
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
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Coefficientsa 
 
H1
FQHC
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .578
a 0.334 0.332 1.038 0.334 128.069 8 2039 0.000 1.909
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 1103.479 8 137.935 128.069 .000
b
Residual 2196.074 2039 1.077
Total 3299.553 2047
b. Dependent Variable: FQHC DUAL GAP RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
a. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, FP1_FAMILY_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: FQHC DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
FP1_FAMILY_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), 
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL
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a. Dependent Variable: FQHC DUAL GAP RATE 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.127 0.086 36.464 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.659 0.053 -0.574 -31.404 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.115 0.047 0.045 2.462 0.014
FP1_FAMILY_PRA
CTICE_SPECIALTY
_CONTROL
0.035 0.061 0.013 0.576 0.565
GP2_GENERAL_P
RACTICE_SPECIA
LTY_CONTROL
0.197 0.203 0.018 0.970 0.332
NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY 
(CONTROL)
0.004 0.073 0.001 0.058 0.953
PA5_PHYSICIAN_A
SSISTANT_SPECIA
LTY_CONTROL
-0.028 0.064 -0.010 -0.435 0.663
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
0.000 0.002 -0.004 -0.197 0.844
GENDER_F1_CON
TROL
-0.022 0.046 -0.009 -0.481 0.630
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Coefficientsa 
 
 
H2
FAMILY PRACTICE (M.D.)
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .592
a 0.350 0.348 0.949 0.350 159.479 7 2069 0.000 1.816
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 1005.958 7 143.708 159.479 .000
b
Residual 1864.399 2069 0.901
Total 2870.356 2076
a. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: FAMILY PRACTICE DUAL GAP RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: FAMILY PRACTICE DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.112 0.055 56.182 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.579 0.049 -0.580 -32.549 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.149 0.043 0.063 3.508 0.000
MS2_MULTISPECI
ALTY_STRUCTUR
E_CONTROL
-0.087 0.051 -0.037 -1.698 0.090
FQ3_FQHC_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
-0.175 0.090 -0.069 -1.951 0.051
PC4_PCMH_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
-0.038 0.137 -0.006 -0.274 0.784
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
0.007 0.003 0.088 2.261 0.024
GENDER_F1_CON
TROL
-0.043 0.042 -0.018 -1.014 0.311
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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a. Dependent Variable: FAMILY PRACTICE DUAL GAP RATE 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
 
 
H2
GENERAL PRACTICE (M.D.)
R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
1 .669
a 0.448 0.421 0.864
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 75.601 6 12.600 16.893 .000
b
Residual 93.236 125 0.746
Total 168.837 131
Model Summary
Model
a. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: GENERAL PRACTICE DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
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a. Dependent Variable: GENERAL PRACTICE DUAL GAP RATE 
 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.021 0.198 15.243 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.329 0.163 -0.560 -8.167 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.697 0.168 0.308 4.144 0.000
MS2_MULTISPECI
ALTY_STRUCTUR
E_CONTROL
-0.377 0.186 -0.167 -2.028 0.045
FQ3_FQHC_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
0.144 0.314 0.052 0.459 0.647
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
-0.005 0.016 -0.031 -0.310 0.757
GENDER_F1_CON
TROL
-0.308 0.154 -0.136 -2.001 0.048
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Coefficientsa 
 
H2
INTERNAL MEDICINE (M.D.)
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .623
a 0.388 0.385 0.967 0.388 119.011 7 1312 0.000 1.777
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 778.417 7 111.202 119.011 .000
b
Residual 1225.914 1312 0.934
Total 2004.331 1319
R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
a. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: INTERNAL MEDICINE DUAL GAP RATE
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: INTERNAL MEDICINE DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
Model Summaryb
Model
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a. Dependent Variable: INTERNAL MEDICINE DUAL GAP RATE 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.127 0.070 44.475 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.704 0.060 -0.617 -28.520 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.145 0.055 0.059 2.621 0.009
MS2_MULTISPECI
ALTY_STRUCTUR
E_CONTROL
-0.013 0.068 -0.005 -0.199 0.842
FQ3_FQHC_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
0.190 0.104 0.076 1.830 0.068
PC4_PCMH_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
0.224 0.137 0.041 1.629 0.103
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
-0.006 0.004 -0.072 -1.582 0.114
GENDER_F1_CON
TROL
-0.032 0.055 -0.013 -0.590 0.555
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Coefficientsa 
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: NURSE PRACTITIONER DUAL GAP RATE 
H2
NURSE PRACTITIONER (MIDLEVEL)
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .634
a 0.401 0.394 0.983 0.401 55.102 7 575 0.000 1.837
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 372.387 7 53.198 55.102 .000
b
Residual 555.128 575 0.965
Total 927.515 582
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: NURSE PRACTITIONER DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
a. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: NURSE PRACTITIONER DUAL GAP RATE
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 2.977 0.155 19.245 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.653 0.090 -0.604 -18.471 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.294 0.086 0.117 3.419 0.001
MS2_MULTISPECI
ALTY_STRUCTUR
-0.040 0.128 -0.014 -0.314 0.754
FQ3_FQHC_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
-0.006 0.160 -0.002 -0.036 0.971
PC4_PCMH_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
0.266 0.193 0.053 1.374 0.170
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
0.003 0.005 0.038 0.595 0.552
GENDER_F1_CON
TROL
-0.003 0.085 -0.001 -0.034 0.973
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Coefficientsa 
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT DUAL GAP RATE 
H2
PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .628
a 0.394 0.389 0.980 0.394 82.418 7 888 0.000 1.858
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 554.415 7 79.202 82.418 .000
b
Residual 853.349 888 0.961
Total 1407.764 895
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), GENDER_F1_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, MS2_MULTISPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT DUAL GAP RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.370 0.142 23.761 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.744 0.074 -0.617 -23.418 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.038 0.067 0.015 0.566 0.571
MS2_MULTISPECI
ALTY_STRUCTUR
E_CONTROL
-0.190 0.130 -0.053 -1.467 0.143
FQ3_FQHC_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
-0.148 0.148 -0.058 -0.995 0.320
PC4_PCMH_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
0.020 0.201 0.003 0.099 0.921
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
0.006 0.005 0.073 1.325 0.186
GENDER_F1_CON
TROL
-0.136 0.067 -0.054 -2.022 0.043
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
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Coefficientsa 
 
H3
MALE
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .618
a 0.382 0.380 0.947 0.382 165.787 10 2681 0.000 1.793
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 1485.366 10 148.537 165.787 .000
b
Residual 2402.044 2681 0.896
Total 3887.410 2691
a. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
DUMMY_IV_POST1, GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY (CONTROL), PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, SS1_SINGLE_SPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: MALE DUAL GAP RATE
ANOVAa
Model
1
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
a. Dependent Variable: MALE DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
DUMMY_IV_POST1, GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), 
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
SS1_SINGLE_SPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
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a. Dependent Variable: MALE DUAL GAP RATE 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.055 0.056 54.681 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.616 0.041 -0.602 -39.292 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.199 0.037 0.083 5.305 0.000
SS1_SINGLE_SPE
CIALTY_STRUCTU
RE_CONTROL
0.076 0.047 0.031 1.607 0.108
FQ3_FQHC_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
0.010 0.078 0.004 0.125 0.901
PC4_PCMH_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
0.156 0.115 0.023 1.358 0.175
GP2_GENERAL_P
RACTICE_SPECIA
LTY_CONTROL
0.153 0.117 0.020 1.308 0.191
IM3_INTERNAL_M
EDICINE_SPECIAL
TY_CONTROL
-0.061 0.044 -0.023 -1.383 0.167
NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY 
(CONTROL)
-0.034 0.072 -0.008 -0.467 0.640
PA5_PHYSICIAN_A
SSISTANT_SPECIA
LTY_CONTROL
0.002 0.055 0.001 0.030 0.976
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
0.000 0.003 -0.005 -0.158 0.874
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Coefficientsa 
H3
FEMALE
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .604
a 0.365 0.362 0.980 0.365 132.636 10 2305 0.000 1.797
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 1275.068 10 127.507 132.636 .000
b
Residual 2215.856 2305 0.961
Total 3490.924 2315
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: FEMALE DUAL GAP RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, 
IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
SS1_SINGLE_SPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE_PCP_COUNT_CONTROL, IM3_INTERNAL_MEDICINE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, DUMMY_IV_POST1, 
PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, GP2_GENERAL_PRACTICE_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), 
PC4_PCMH_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, PA5_PHYSICIAN_ASSISTANT_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
SS1_SINGLE_SPECIALTY_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_FQHC_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: FEMALE DUAL GAP RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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a. Dependent Variable: FEMALE DUAL GAP RATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.053 0.065 46.722 0.000
PREMIUM_DESIGN
ATION_YES1
-1.672 0.047 -0.596 -35.659 0.000
DUMMY_IV_POST1 0.112 0.042 0.045 2.634 0.008
SS1_SINGLE_SPE
CIALTY_STRUCTU
RE_CONTROL
0.081 0.054 0.032 1.484 0.138
FQ3_FQHC_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
-0.057 0.076 -0.023 -0.754 0.451
PC4_PCMH_STRU
CTURE_CONTROL
0.083 0.102 0.016 0.814 0.415
GP2_GENERAL_P
RACTICE_SPECIA
LTY_CONTROL
-0.075 0.130 -0.010 -0.580 0.562
IM3_INTERNAL_M
EDICINE_SPECIAL
TY_CONTROL
-0.056 0.054 -0.019 -1.038 0.300
NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER 
SPECIALTY 
(CONTROL)
-0.027 0.062 -0.008 -0.437 0.662
PA5_PHYSICIAN_A
SSISTANT_SPECIA
LTY_CONTROL
-0.132 0.060 -0.042 -2.206 0.027
SIZE_PCP_COUNT
_CONTROL
0.005 0.003 0.065 1.960 0.050
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Appendix E. Regression (within Financial Incentive Period only) 
 
Coefficientsa 
 
H1
SINGLE SPECIALTY
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .692
a 0.479 0.474 0.803 0.479 86.247 9 843 0.000 1.648
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
500.645 9 55.627 86.247 .000
b
Residual 543.717 843 0.645
Total 1044.362 852
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: SINGLE SPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, IM3_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
SIZE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, IM3_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY 
(CONTROL), PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: SINGLE SPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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a. Dependent Variable: SINGLE SPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.375 0.066 51.172 0.000
GENDER_
F1_CONT
ROL
-0.208 0.058 -0.093 -3.608 0.000
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.097 0.108 -0.040 -0.895 0.371
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
0.343 0.294 0.032 1.166 0.244
GP2_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
0.505 0.161 0.080 3.138 0.002
IM3_SPEC
IALTY_CO
NTROL
-0.086 0.064 -0.035 -1.344 0.179
NP4_NUR
SE 
PRACTITI
ONER 
SPECIALT
Y 
(CONTRO
L)
0.218 0.121 0.048 1.803 0.072
PA5_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
0.021 0.120 0.005 0.171 0.864
SIZE_CO
NTROL
0.005 0.007 0.030 0.680 0.497
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.644 0.063 -0.661 -25.942 0.000
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
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Coefficientsa 
 
H1
MULTISPECIALTY
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .766
a 0.587 0.584 0.777 0.587 258.771 9 1641 0.000 1.793
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
1404.445 9 156.049 258.771 .000
b
Residual 989.588 1641 0.603
Total 2394.033 1650
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, FP1_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), 
PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, FP1_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
SIZE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), 
PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: MULTISPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: MULTISPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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a. Dependent Variable: MULTISPEC DUAL_GAP_RATE 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.424 0.056 60.844 0.000
GENDER_
F1_CONT
ROL
-0.037 0.039 -0.016 -0.961 0.337
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.211 0.096 -0.086 -2.196 0.028
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.013 0.079 -0.004 -0.162 0.872
FP1_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
0.056 0.050 0.022 1.112 0.266
GP2_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
0.077 0.131 0.010 0.588 0.557
NP4_NUR
SE 
PRACTITI
ONER 
SPECIALT
Y 
(CONTRO
L)
0.081 0.064 0.024 1.271 0.204
PA5_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
-0.070 0.055 -0.025 -1.273 0.203
SIZE_CO
NTROL
0.007 0.003 0.086 2.295 0.022
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.984 0.042 -0.759 -47.598 0.000
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
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Coefficientsa 
 
H1
FQHC
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .751
a 0.564 0.560 0.793 0.564 146.174 8 904 0.000 1.758
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
736.025 8 92.003 146.174 .000
b
Residual 568.985 904 0.629
Total 1305.009 912
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: FQHC DUAL_GAP_RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
GENDER_F1_CONTROL, GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), IM3_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), IM3_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: FQHC DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
 103 
 
a. Dependent Variable: FQHC DUAL_GAP_RATE 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.526 0.097 36.177 0.000
GENDER_
F1_CONT
ROL
-0.035 0.053 -0.014 -0.652 0.515
MS2_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.106 0.100 -0.039 -1.064 0.288
GP2_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
0.360 0.285 0.028 1.263 0.207
IM3_SPEC
IALTY_CO
NTROL
-0.142 0.070 -0.051 -2.021 0.044
NP4_NUR
SE 
PRACTITI
ONER 
SPECIALT
Y 
(CONTRO
L)
-0.006 0.083 -0.002 -0.077 0.939
PA5_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
-0.158 0.069 -0.058 -2.271 0.023
SIZE_CO
NTROL
0.003 0.004 0.026 0.711 0.477
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.953 0.058 -0.749 -33.581 0.000
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
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Coefficientsa 
 
H2
FAMILY PRACTICE (M.D.)
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .714
a 0.509 0.506 0.797 0.509 178.508 6 1032 0.000 1.829
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
679.641 6 113.274 178.508 .000
b
Residual 654.864 1032 0.635
Total 1334.505 1038
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SS1_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SS1_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: FP DUAL_GAP_RATE
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: FP DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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a. Dependent Variable: FP DUAL_GAP_RATE 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.330 0.067 50.041 0.000
GENDER_
F1_CONT
ROL
-0.087 0.050 -0.038 -1.731 0.084
SS1_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
0.128 0.061 0.056 2.115 0.035
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.190 0.110 -0.076 -1.722 0.085
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.045 0.127 -0.010 -0.355 0.722
SIZE_CO
NTROL
0.009 0.004 0.115 2.356 0.019
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.810 0.057 -0.705 -31.719 0.000
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
H2
GENERAL PRACTICE (M.D.)
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .726
a 0.527 0.479 0.849 0.527 10.948 6 59 0.000 2.007
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
47.380 6 7.897 10.948 .000
b
Residual 42.555 59 0.721
Total 89.935 65
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: GP DUAL_GAP_RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_CONTROL, 
GENDER_F1_CONTROL, SS1_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, SS1_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: GP DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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Coefficientsa 
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: GP DUAL_GAP_RATE 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.377 0.267 12.669 0.000
GENDER_
F1_CONT
ROL
-0.286 0.230 -0.122 -1.244 0.218
SS1_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
0.548 0.256 0.231 2.139 0.037
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.194 0.478 -0.054 -0.405 0.687
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.080 0.353 -0.029 -0.226 0.822
SIZE_CO
NTROL
0.005 0.020 0.037 0.253 0.801
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.560 0.228 -0.657 -6.856 0.000
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Coefficientsa 
 
H2
INTERNAL MEDICINE (M.D.)
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .737
a 0.544 0.539 0.798 0.544 129.661 6 653 0.000 1.718
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
495.050 6 82.508 129.661 .000
b
Residual 415.531 653 0.636
Total 910.581 659
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: IM DUAL_GAP_RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: IM DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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a. Dependent Variable: IM DUAL_GAP_RATE 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.436 0.074 46.584 0.000
GENDER_
F1_CONT
ROL
-0.078 0.065 -0.033 -1.210 0.227
MS2_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
0.021 0.078 0.009 0.272 0.786
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.010 0.126 -0.004 -0.083 0.934
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
0.120 0.127 0.032 0.949 0.343
SIZE_CO
NTROL
-0.003 0.004 -0.038 -0.693 0.489
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.887 0.069 -0.732 -27.377 0.000
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
H2
NURSE PRACTITIONER (MIDLEVEL)
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .771
a 0.595 0.586 0.773 0.595 69.439 6 284 0.000 1.850
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
248.793 6 41.466 69.439 .000
b
Residual 169.592 284 0.597
Total 418.385 290
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL, MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: NP DUAL_GAP_RATE
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: NP DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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Coefficientsa 
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: NP DUAL_GAP_RATE 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.584 0.166 21.596 0.000
GENDER_
F1_CONT
ROL
0.025 0.095 0.010 0.259 0.796
MS2_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.222 0.153 -0.073 -1.455 0.147
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.144 0.193 -0.060 -0.743 0.458
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
0.241 0.174 0.069 1.385 0.167
SIZE_CO
NTROL
0.006 0.006 0.083 1.061 0.290
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.924 0.098 -0.766 -19.695 0.000
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Coefficientsa 
 
 
H2
PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .783
a 0.613 0.608 0.760 0.613 116.496 6 441 0.000 1.716
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
404.197 6 67.366 116.496 .000
b
Residual 255.018 441 0.578
Total 659.215 447
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, SIZE_CONTROL, GENDER_F1_CONTROL, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: PA DUAL_GAP_RATE
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: PA DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.696 0.140 26.457 0.000
GENDER_
F1_CONT
ROL
-0.163 0.074 -0.067 -2.205 0.028
MS2_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.288 0.140 -0.081 -2.052 0.041
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.284 0.155 -0.117 -1.828 0.068
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.041 0.168 -0.009 -0.247 0.805
SIZE_CO
NTROL
0.009 0.005 0.120 2.009 0.045
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-2.007 0.078 -0.766 -25.589 0.000
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
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a. Dependent Variable: PA DUAL_GAP_RATE 
 
Coefficientsa 
 
H3
MALE
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .740
a 0.548 0.545 0.798 0.548 180.078 9 1336 0.000 1.722
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
1030.779 9 114.531 180.078 .000
b
Residual 849.705 1336 0.636
Total 1880.484 1345
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: MALE DUAL_GAP_RATE
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_CONTROL, 
IM3_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), 
PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, SIZE_CONTROL, IM3_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: MALE DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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a. Dependent Variable: MALE DUAL_GAP_RATE 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.542 0.055 64.533 0.000
MS2_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.128 0.056 -0.052 -2.304 0.021
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.024 0.097 -0.010 -0.247 0.805
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
0.132 0.105 0.028 1.258 0.209
GP2_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
0.281 0.138 0.038 2.042 0.041
IM3_SPEC
IALTY_CO
NTROL
-0.064 0.052 -0.025 -1.225 0.221
NP4_NUR
SE 
PRACTITI
ONER 
SPECIALT
Y 
(CONTRO
L)
0.019 0.086 0.004 0.225 0.822
PA5_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
-0.035 0.065 -0.011 -0.541 0.588
SIZE_CO
NTROL
-0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.176 0.861
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.860 0.047 -0.735 -39.783 0.000
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
1
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Coefficientsa 
 
H3
FEMALE
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .739
a 0.547 0.543 0.779 0.547 153.771 9 1148 0.000 1.845
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regressio
n
838.921 9 93.213 153.771 .000
b
Residual 695.900 1148 0.606
Total 1534.821 1157
b. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE 
PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), SIZE_CONTROL, IM3_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
a. Predictors: (Constant), PREMIUM_DESIGNATION_YES1, PA5_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, PC4_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, 
GP2_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, NP4_NURSE PRACTITIONER SPECIALTY (CONTROL), SIZE_CONTROL, IM3_SPECIALTY_CONTROL, 
MS2_STRUCTURE_CONTROL, FQ3_STRUCTURE_CONTROL
b. Dependent Variable: FEMALE DUAL_GAP_RATE
ANOVAa
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: FEMALE DUAL_GAP_RATE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Change Statistics
Durbin-
Watson
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a. Dependent Variable: FEMALE DUAL_GAP_RATE 
 
  
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3.404 0.065 52.658 0.000
MS2_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.097 0.062 -0.040 -1.571 0.116
FQ3_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
-0.169 0.086 -0.072 -1.964 0.050
PC4_STR
UCTURE_
CONTROL
0.002 0.090 0.001 0.023 0.982
GP2_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
0.143 0.149 0.020 0.963 0.336
IM3_SPEC
IALTY_CO
NTROL
-0.077 0.061 -0.028 -1.266 0.206
NP4_NUR
SE 
PRACTITI
ONER 
SPECIALT
Y 
(CONTRO
L)
0.077 0.070 0.024 1.102 0.271
PA5_SPE
CIALTY_C
ONTROL
-0.188 0.067 -0.065 -2.817 0.005
SIZE_CO
NTROL
0.009 0.003 0.120 3.069 0.002
PREMIUM
_DESIGN
ATION_YE
S1
-1.889 0.053 -0.721 -35.724 0.000
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
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